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ABSTRACT 
Instances of piracy have been increasing since 2006, and the international community can 
ignore this problem no more.  Legal, socio-economic, and technological issues hinder 
multi-national efforts to combat piracy effectively.  Response to events of piracy are 
oftentimes late, as reporting of incidents is also mired in legal issues; however, 
technology does exist that can notify companies that a ship is being attacked by pirates as 
the attack occurs or possibly prior to the attack if the attackers display intent.  This 
technology is the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), and The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has mandated that all ships greater than 500 gross tons (United 
States Coast Guard, 2004) shall be equipped with an SSAS.  The problem lies in who 
should receive the SSAS attack alert notification.  Currently, these distress signals only 
go to the company that owns the ship.  This thesis will investigate the implications of 
SSAS reports directly fed to existing Navy networks, and show that small changes to 
existing Navy Maritime Operations C2 structure could result in an optimization in force 
employment and timeliness of response. 
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Piracy is defined by the International Maritime Bureau as “An act of boarding or 
attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime 
and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” 
(Dillon, 2005).  Piracy thrives in ungoverned spaces and particularly in narrow 
waterways around the globe.  The issue of cooperating with governments that either, 
permit piracy, behave ambivalently toward it or, worse yet, are powerless to act against it 
are the most complex of all.  An increase in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden is only the 
most recent example of the impacts of piracy on the world’s commercial and private 
shipping industry.  Legal issues, international coalitions, different geographic areas of 
responsibility and different reporting entities are all challenges to timely piracy reporting.   
The response to incidents of piracy by governments and private organizations has 
been inconsistent.  For insurance companies, it has been easier to allow the vessel to be 
taken, at which point ransom is then paid.  Some governments have chosen to fight back 
against pirates, detaining pirates and destroying their property when opportunities present 
themselves, while other governments choose not to respond or remain powerless to do so.  
These inconsistent practices increase the response time of nation state forces sent to 
respond to singular incidents of piracy.     
Commercially available technology could easily be integrated into U.S. Navy 
command and control architecture to alert anti-piracy assets before pirates board vessels 
and take crews hostage. Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS) are required on all merchant 
vessels greater than 500 gross tons.  When the alarm is triggered, current reporting 
procedures alert the home office of the company that owns the vessel.   
Attention must be paid to the operational climate of any region in which piracy is 
an ongoing threat.  Piracy is one of many warfare areas drawing on the resources of the 
Combatant Commander; this must be considered when forces are (notionally) allocated.  
The model in this thesis will attempt to show the amount of time each person in the 
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Command and Control organization will allocate to this mission.  This thesis then intends 
to demonstrate that an organizational structure that facilitates a more streamlined 
reporting process, and commercially available technologies, can expedite a response from 
U.S. Forces.    
B. GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDING 
Piracy is a global problem; however, this thesis focuses on established Somali 
pirate areas of operation, to include the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.  Focusing on 
this geographic area helps to frame the structure of the Department of Defense forces that 
monitor, assess, allocate forces and respond to piracy.  For the purposes of this thesis, the 
scope of reporting procedures and organizational structures that support response to 
incidents of piracy is bounded geographically by U.S. Central Command’s area of 
responsibility.  As piracy is a maritime domain problem, U.S. Naval Central Command 
(NAVCENT) is the responsible agent for executing maritime operations in the waters 
surrounding the Horn of Africa.  The Maritime Operations Center (MOC) at NAVCENT 
exists, “to streamline the operational cycle and to provide a structure for quickly and 
effectively establishing support for an operational level maritime commander” (Department 
of the Navy, 2008). 
C. CURRENT CHALLENGES/THESIS INTENT 
Piracy exists globally because it is an established criminal activity that preys upon 
slow moving merchant ships with little or no means of self defense.  With more than 90% 
of the global trade moved by sea, modern piracy can be blamed for an estimated annual 
loss between 13 to 16 billion dollars  world wide (International Maritime Organization, 
2005).  This thesis will focus on piracy in and around the Horn of Africa.  Many factors 
are credited with the genesis of this modern pirate threat.  Perhaps the largest contributing 
factor is the lack of a centralized government in Somalia with control throughout the 
country, though seven factors are cited that take a more precise look at the overarching 
reason, “Legal and jurisdictional weakness, Favorable geography, Conflict and disorder, 
Underfunded law-enforcement/weak security, Permissive political environments, Cultural 
acceptability and the promise of reward” (Murphy, 2009). 
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Exacerbating these environmentally permissive issues are the legal and industry 
standards of current international maritime shipping.  Currently, the industry standard for 
reports of pirate attacks is to notify the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy 
Reporting Center (PRC).  This is completely voluntary, however, and no ship is required 
to do this beyond specific shipping company policy. The decision to report an incident of 
piracy and to request assistance to an incident of piracy is left up to the shipping 
company.  The IMB states that its PRC “works closely with various governments and law 
enforcement agencies and is involved in information sharing in an attempt to reduce and 
ultimately eradicate this crime” (International Maritime Bureau, 2010).   
The apparent reluctance to report these incidents stems from the number of 
organizations, corporate and state, involved in the shipping trade.  There is no clearly 
delineated reporting chain for vessels operated by companies headquartered in foreign 
countries that do not hold the registration for that vessel.  This has led to the reports of 
pirate attacks going to the PRC (which can take no action to stem the pirate scourge), and 
the shipping company executives who ask for help at their leisure.  This process works only 
in terms of forewarning mariners of areas where the threat of piracy exists.  It does little to 
combat the problem directly.  This problem cannot be avoided simply by not going where 
the pirates are.  This is because the cost to shipping companies to reroute ships longer 
distances increases the cost of operations and pirates have likewise have invested enough in 
their trade to expand their reach clear across the Indian Ocean.  In March of 2010, the M/V 
Frigia was attacked and taken by Somali pirates more than 1,000 miles off the coast of 
Somalia.  “That ship sailed through the dangerous zone in a convoy, escorted by (Turkish 
navy frigates) the Gediz and Gelibolu,” a spokesman, Ayhan Ugurlubay, told Turkey's 
state-run Anatolia news agency” (Rice, 2010).   
Reengineering large organizational structures such as the Department of Defense 
or Department of the Navy is difficult and the consequences of such a change may not 
turn out as they were envisioned. In the information age, technology changes to an 
organization‘s enterprise architecture can also have unknown consequences when 
changes to an organization’s enterprise architecture are made. Small changes to an 
organization’s C2 structure can give an organization a competitive advantage by 
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optimizing the speed at which an organization conducts business and optimizing force 
structure.  The “As Is” process of piracy reporting is examined closely to find areas that 
are impediments to the flow of information.  The “To Be” process looks to propose 
changes to areas discovered in the “As Is” process.  This thesis proposes a small change 
in reporting structure and reporting technology can optimize force structure and the speed 
at which the Navy responds to an incident of piracy. 
The NAVCENT MOC is the ideal candidate to directly receive information 
regarding an act of piracy to begin the process of supporting an operational level 
maritime commander in deciding courses of action to a specific incident.  There are many 
vectors for notification by the Merchant ships.  International Maritime Satellites 
(INMARSAT) is a technology shared by both the U.S. Navy and the commercial 
shipping industry to enable the exchange of e-mail for notification of pirate attack.  The 
use of commercial satellite phones also enables merchant ships to call for help. Another 
emerging technology is the Ship’s Security Alert System, which transmits text and SMS 
messages to whomever the company directs.  This thesis proposes that this technology 
will greatly improve the speed with which U.S. naval forces are notified when merchant 
ships are required to report direct to a MOC.  The authors test this hypothesis through 
computer based experimentation using POW-ER software.       
Current reporting procedures have proven legally expedient, but experience 
significant time lag both in the physical act of the report as well as notification between 
various agencies with the U.S. government.  This time lag is unacceptable when the 
default response is the sortie of U.S. military forces independent of the amount of time 
provided for appropriate planning and execution of operations.  Small changes to 
Command and Control functions in the existing reporting system can lead to the 
construction of a new framework optimizing forces on station while maximizing time to 
respond.  While the United States cannot require foreign flagged vessels to report attacks 
to the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard can require U.S. flagged ships to report attacks as 
a part of the vessels’ annual Certificate of Inspection.  The intent of this thesis, however, 
is to postulate the benefits of using the Ship’s Security Alert System (SSAS) by U.S. 
flagged merchant ships directly reporting to U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet Maritime Operations 
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Center.  By answering the questions below, the authors believe this to be one practical 
way to give the advantage to U.S. military forces operating in a dynamic environment 
spanning millions of miles of ocean.      
1. Which is the optimal method for reporting incidents of piracy that will 
minimize response time and increase the probability of disrupting the 
event before it becomes a hostage/ransom situation? 
2. What changes to the command and control structure provide for mission 
optimization and optimization of forces in theater? 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. The procedures represented in the model as well as the interactions between 
the positions are derived from the U.S. Navy’s MOC Concept of Operations 
NTTP 3-32.1 
2. There is an existing legal requirement by USCG for U.S. flagged merchant 
ship to report pirate attacks to a numbered Fleet’s MOC. 
3. The entire response to these attacks will be coordinated and executed 
unilaterally by U.S. forces. 
4. SSAS technology is mature and compatible with existing U.S. Navy 
networks for seamless implementation.  
5. The results generated by the POW-ER model are statistical approximations. 
6. The model used has complete cooperation with the shipping company 
through its representative (Company Security Officer) in all scenarios. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II of this thesis is a historical review of U.S. Government response to 
incidents of piracy throughout history, an in-depth look at Somali pirate groups to include 
their Command and Control structures and a technology review of Ship Security Alert 
System.  Chapter III introduces POW-ER 2.0 software as a tool for modeling piracy 
reporting procedures as they exist today and proposed changes to those procedures that 
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may decrease the time it takes to respond to an incident of piracy.  Chapter IV will include 
running the POW-ER 2.0 software simulations.  The results from these simulations will be 
contrasted between the “As Is” reporting procedures to the “To Be” reporting procedures.  
Analysis of these results will build the foundation for the recommendations in Chapter V.  
Chapter V will supply recommendations for future areas of research and conclude this 




A. THE TROUBLE WITH PIRATES 
1. Overview 
The challenge of protecting U.S. commercial interests at sea has always been at 
the core of the United States Navy’s mission set.  The first six frigates commissioned 
after the Revolutionary War were built specifically to counter the threat of piracy.  It is 
no surprise, then, that today’s Navy would have a keen interest in combating piracy as it  
is responsible for 13 to 16 billion dollars in annual losses to worldwide maritime trade.  
Effective Command and Control of the forces assigned to combat piracy is essential to 
how planners craft their various responses to emergent situations.   
How then are today’s advanced reporting techniques best exploited by U.S. Navy 
C2 processes within a Maritime Operations Center?  Command and control is defined by 
Joint Publication 1-02 as, “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of the mission”  (CJCS, 1995).  The Navy’s MOC will establish a 
centralized C2 mechanism applying the principles outlined in the joint publication on C2 
processes.  Applying these principles will lay a foundation from which to achieve 
effective command and control.   
Without effective command and control, emergent incidents of piracy in remote 
oceans around the globe can have disastrous consequences.  The issue of maritime piracy 
offers an example of an emergent situation that requires rapid, accurate notification of 
events, and a clearly delineated means of dealing with the threat.  The United States Navy 




commercial shipping, which supports the United States’ and global economies.   History 
offers several dynamic examples of command and control approaches to draw from to 
combat piracy.    
B. PIRACY THROUGH U.S. HISTORY 
1. Barbary Corsairs 
The U.S. response to piracy off the coast of North Africa in the early 1800s was 
the result of U.S. merchant ships being taken by pirates from the Ottoman Empire backed 
nations of Algiers, Tunisia and Tripoli.   
In the 1790s and into the 1800s, the business model was simple and effective for 
the Barbary Coast nations.  Capture of foreign merchant ships provided a source of 
income and labor as the crew of the vessel was forced into labor until ransomed by their 
native country.  In the 1790s, the U.S., having no navy, could do little but pay tribute to 
Algiers to prevent taking of U.S. merchant ships.  In August of 1812, a U.S. merchant 
ship, the brig Edwin, was taken by an Algerine Frigate.  Few details are available about 
the chase and capture of the Edwin, however.  
The pursuer, a frigate armed with two rows of cannon on her broadside, 
overhauled the Edwin. Although no account exists of the chase and 
capture of the Edwin, the scene was played out hundreds of times in that 
era, and there is little doubt of the essentials. As the distance closed, the 
pursuing vessel might have hoisted a green banner with white crescent and 
stars, the flag of Algiers, or she might have dispensed with identifying 
herself and fired a single cannon shot across the bow of the Edwin, the 
timeless display of force meant to be answered by force or submission. 
The unarmed Edwin must have heaved to, backing her topsails to stop and 
submit, as a boat put off from the Algerine frigate loaded with men. 
Rowed over to the Edwin, they would have clambered up her side armed 
with swords and pistols and, shrieking threatening words in Arabic, taken 
control of the brig. The crew of the Edwin, overwhelmed and unnerved, 
insulted and spat upon, surrendered.  (Leiner, 2006) 
Events building up to the capture of the Edwin show that several breakdowns in 
command and control certainly contributed to her capture and the subsequent 
enslavement of her crew in Algeria.  The crew of the Edwin had been hailed at sea five 
years before the Algerine boarding by a French Privateer in the Atlantic in 1807.  The 
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Frenchmen were content to only ask for a top mast and then left the Edwin to go on her 
way (Leiner, 2006). Perhaps the crew of the Edwin expected a similar outcome in August 
25, 1812, with the Algerine frigate. 
The new U.S. Government had difficulty in trying to reach all civilian merchant 
shipping prior to declaration of war against Great Britain.  The Edwin and her 
commander Master George Campbell Smith landed at Gibraltar and then Malta on June 
29, 1812, where, “Neither British authorities ashore nor Master Smith could have 
known…that exactly eleven days earlier the United States had formally declared war 
against Great Britain” (Leiner, 2006). 
On August 5, 1812, the Edwin departed Malta under Royal Navy Convoy on her 
journey home.  Due to poor sailing practices the Edwin lost the convoy one evening and 
was forced to sail alone  (Leiner, 2006).  Without the protection of the convoy the Edwin 
was in a very vulnerable position sailing the waters of the Mediterranean with no means 
to defend the ship against pirate attacks.  The Edwin was taken on August 25, 1812 and 
arrived in port at Algiers a few days later.  The first notification of the incident reached 
the U.S. Consul at Gibraltar in November 1812.  The U.S. had no forces to respond to the 
seizure of the Edwin in the Mediterranean and any forces available were thousands of 
miles away and could take months to arrive.  Nine months passed before President 
Madison would dispatch a representative to negotiate the release of the captured crew in 
Algiers.  
Unlike present day, which is marked by high tech means of communications, the 
early 1800s saw communications move by word of mouth or letter dispatched by sail or 
horseback.  In the age of sail, ships could be expected to average eight knots consistently.  
Given the distances required for information to travel, letters of notification would 
obsolesce en route, preventing a coordinated response outside of local on-scene 
commanders patrolling the waters of the Mediterranean. With no forces in the 
Mediterranean, the U.S. was initially forced to the negotiating table, which forced several 
trans-Atlantic passages moving at eight knots to come to agreeable terms.   
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The capture of the brig Edwin ultimately evoked a military response by the U.S. 
Navy.  Already paying protection money to the Dey of Algeria and incensed that Algeria 
would still take U.S. merchant shipping as plunder, inspired the deployment of two 
squadrons at the order of President Madison to then Secretary of the Navy 
Crowninshield.  Commodore Stephen Decatur was to command the first squadron and 
Commodore William Bainbridge the second.  Decatur’s squadron was to depart first, and 
in large part the success of his mission was due to the clear orders given to him prior to 
departure for the Mediterranean and the conflict with Algeria.  His orders from Secretary 
of the Navy Crowninshield highlight how command and control through commander’s 
intent were used effectively to accomplish the mission.   
 
Figure 1.   Barbary Coast (From Malte-Brun, 1829) 
Decatur’s orders were issued on April 15, 1815, “The orders authorized Decatur 
to subdue, seize, and make Prize of all Vessels, goods & effects belonging to the Dey or 
subjects of Algiers, even as Decatur was to endeavor to capture or destroy any Algerine 
cruisers that he encountered”  (Leiner, 2006).  Decatur was given clear orders as to what 
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his mission was, how his commander’s envisioned the end state of the mission but 
Decatur was given considerable latitude in how to accomplish that mission given that 
communications in the age of sail were slow.  
Dispatching forces locally to the waters of the Mediterranean was necessary to 
carry out the commander’s intent.  Given the speed and frequency of pirate attacks 
distance between Decatur and Jefferson would not allow for day to day oversight of the 
operations of the Mediterranean Squadron.   Due to the fact that communications could 
take months to travel from the Mediterranean back to the United States, Decatur had to 
have a clear idea of what the mission would be in order to organize his forces and commit 
them to the fight effectively.  The orders issued by the Secretary of the Navy were 
explicit enough on who the war was with and what the expected outcome of the war 
would be; it was up to Decatur on how he would use his squadron of ships to fight 
Algerine ships.     
 
Figure 2.   Decatur’s action against the Philadelphia (From Fraser, 1920) 
As Decatur sailed into the Mediterranean his understanding, although not 
described in the same way as today, of the command and control process turned into a 
victory against several Algerian ships including the defeat and death of Algeria’s most 
decorated admiral, Reis Hammida, which proved to be powerful bargaining chips to the 
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Dey of Algeria helping the U.S. in its political negotiations with Algeria.  The Observe, 
Orient, Decide and Act or OODA loop can be applied to Decatur’s campaign in the 
Mediterranean in the summer of 1815 and his successful taking of an Algerine frigate 
Mashouda and an Algerine brig Estedio.   Information fuels the C2 process, in the case of 
Decatur’s Mediterranean squadron he set out to gather quality information about the 
location of Algerine ships sailing alone, especially a command ship.  Decatur learned 
from the American consul at Cadiz that an Algerine squadron was active in the 
Mediterranean and later confirmed that intelligence with the consul at Tangier.  Decatur 
further fueled his understanding of the situation when at Gibraltar he received 
information that the Mashouda and Admiral Hammida could be found off of the coast of 
Spain waiting to receive tribute payment from the Spanish Government  (DeKay, 2004).  
This information allowed Decatur to dictate the terms of the situation to the Algerians by 
allowing him to act before his adversary.  
Decatur’s presence in the Mediterranean allowed him to match the speed of 
operations the pirates of Algiers were operating at, in this case approximately 8 knots.  
With forces positioned in the operating area interdiction of pirates became realizable.  
Operating under a clear commander’s intent prevented delay in operations allowing 
Decatur to capitalize on time sensitive information and battlefield successes.   
The gathering of accurate, relevant information helped Decatur achieve 
understanding of the situation.  In this case the understanding that if part of his mission 
was to capture Algerine ships, the capturing of arguably one of the most important 
Algerine ships, that of Admiral Hammida, would affect the Algerian’s OODA loop 
extensively.  Decatur meanwhile observed, through the gathering of information, that 
there was in fact an Algerine squadron active in the Mediterranean, oriented himself to 
the fact that it was a flag ship commanded by Algeria’s greatest Admiral, decided he 
would find and attack it and acted upon that decision when the American squadron found 
the Mashouda 20 miles off the coast of Spain.  Effective command and control aided in 
the success of Decatur’s Mediterranean squadron leading to new treaties with the Barbary 
states in which the United States no longer would pay tribute.  This resulted in the United 
States adopting a policy of countering and deterring piracy through forcible means.     
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2.  The Mayaguez Incident 
On 12 May 1975, the U.S. flagged MV Mayaguez was attacked and seized in the 
vicinity of the Poulo Wai Islands.  Although there is debate about whether or not the 
taking of the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez was an act of piracy there is no doubt that it 
was an emergent crisis situation at sea.  The incident involved a U.S. flagged merchant 
vessel and its crew being interdicted and boarded by a Cambodian gunboat.  The 
following is outside support claiming that the Mayaguez incident was an act of piracy.  In 
the Naval War College Newport Papers titled Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and 
Modern Cases author of Chapter Four Charles Koburger Jr. includes the Mayaguez 
incident as a well known example of piracy in the South China Sea  (Koburger, 2010).  
Additionally, shortly after a meeting with his National Security Council (NSC) regarding 
the taking of the Mayaguez, then President Gerald Ford, “issued a press release declaring 
the seizure an act of piracy, holding the Cambodian Khymer Rouge government 
responsible”  (Guilmartin, 1995). 
Shortly after the fall of Cambodia to the Communists on 17 April 1975 and 
similar incident unfolding in Vietnam on 30 April 1975, the incident of the Merchant 
Vessel Mayaguez would unfold.  On 12 May 1975 approximately six and half miles from 
the Poulo Wai Islands the Mayaguez was seized by Cambodian gunboats  (Paust, 1976).  
The Mayaguez was steaming from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand.  The Cambodian 
gunboat approached the Mayaguez, which was steaming at 12.5 knots and with a 
boarding party from the gunboat took control of the Mayaguez, it was 1421 local time 
and 0321 in Washington, D.C.  (Guilmartin, 1995).  U.S. military reconnaissance assets 
were providing aerial reconnaissance of the situation hours after the incident unfolded 
providing the chain of command with their interpretation of events unfolding on the seas 
below them. 
The fact that the Mayaguez was a U.S. flagged vessel gave the USG the speed to 
begin planning immediately on reclaiming the ship through diplomatic means or military 
force.  The response time would have been much longer had the vessel been flagged 
under a different country and had a foreign crew aboard because input would have to be  
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gathered from those foreign governments on how to proceed with reclaiming the vessel.  
Similar to the era of the Barbary Pirates the U.S. was able to act unilaterally against 
hostile states attacking their merchant ships.   
It is important to understand how and when the U.S. government was notified of 
the incident that would provide it with the information to respond with a joint military 
effort.  It is also important to consider that many advances in military technology 
especially weapons technology were at the disposal of responders to the Mayaguez crisis.  
“But the advent of actual world-wide communications, offering national leaders the 
possibility of immediate control of military forces on a global basis, was surely among 
the most important”  (Guilmartin, 1995). 
Minutes prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez, crew members transmitted, “an 
SOS in Morse Code on standard maritime distress frequencies…” and “then broadcast an 
emergency message in the clear on HF (high frequency) voice radio”  (Guilmartin, 1995).  
A Mr. John Neal received the SOS at 0718 Zulu (Z) hours in Djakarta, Java working for 
the Delta Exploration Company  (Guilmartin, 1995).  The transmission picked up by John 
Neal from the Mayaguez is as follows: “Have been fired upon and boarded by 
Cambodian armed forces at 9 degrees 48 minutes north/l02 degrees 53 minutes east.  





Figure 3.   Map of Kaoh Tang Island (From Commons, 2010) 
John Neal relayed this information to the U.S. Embassy also in Djakarta, Java.  
Two hours after the U.S. Embassy receipt of the SOS message it was relayed to 
Washington, D.C.  After word of this moved up the chain of command in Washington, 
“At twenty to eight in the morning eastern daylight time, President Gerald Ford was 
notified by Lt. Gen Brent Scowcroft, USAF…just over six hours had elapsed since the 
Mayaguez transmitted her SOS” (Guilmartin, 1995).  At 1205, a meeting of the National 
Security Council was called the outcome of which set in motion the use of military force 
when diplomatic efforts proved to be ineffective in trying to secure the release of the 
Mayaguez and her crew.  Six hours after the Mayaguez was taken, the information had 
reached the President of the United States’ desk, and initial planning for the retaking of 
the Mayaguez was laid down.  
When a pirate attack occurs, swift notification is critical to begin developing 
courses of action and well-established lines of communication are critical to directing 
forces to be utilized in any operations against a pirated vessel.  The fact that 
communications moved so swiftly enabled the USG to interdict and prevent the 
Mayaguez from being towed to Kompong Som and well within Cambodia’s territorial  
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waters.  The speed at which communications traveled at the time was an advantage only 
if the C2 structure for disseminating operational orders was in place.  This is evident in 
two instances with the Mayaguez.   
The first instance is the information flow that alerted President Ford that the 
Mayaguez was taken.  The reporting scheme was a series of relayed communications that 
took six hours from distress signal to notification of the President.  Had the distress signal 
gone to a designated contact within the USG or military to handle such events, relay upon 
relay of the information, which proved to be time consuming, would not have occurred.  
The planning process by President Ford and his staff did not occur until six hours after 
the ship was taken.   
The second instance was the C2 structure and subsequent information flow that 
would direct U.S. military forces to retake the Mayaguez.  After deliberating on courses 
of action, late in the day of the 13th and into the 14th the order had been given to use force 
to prevent the Mayaguez from being towed to the Cambodian mainland port city of 
Kompong Som.   The communications apparatus in this instance was critical in relaying 
information to U.S. decision makers to begin developing a course of action for how to 
respond to the seizure of the American flagged vessel and coordination of forces involved 
in the operation to recover the Mayaguez.  The communications links and nodes are 





Figure 4.   Communications for S.S. Mayaguez response/Kaoh Tang Operation (From 
Office of the Joint Seceratary, 1976) 
Operational command of forces on scene was given to Commander U.S. Support 
Activities Group/7th Air Force (COMUSSAG/7AF).  Upon being established as the on-
scene commander COMUSSAG/7AF released the following message, “…The 
international implications of this operation make restraint imperative.  Complete 
command and control must be maintained by COMUSSAG/7AF, who will be acting 
upon direction from the National Military Command Center…”  (Office of the Joint 
Seceratary, 1976).  The selection of one on-scene commander enabled all operational 
forces to be leveraged in a cohesive unified way.  Below is an excerpt from the after 
action report of the Mayaguez incident detailing objectives for COMUSSAG/7AF to 
accomplish.  The efficiency of communications and clearly delineated C2 structure 
enabled a chain of command to be established that was able to communicate a plan to 
superiors for approval and then disseminate that plan to subordinates for action.  With a 
plan in place:  
Just before one o’clock in the morning of 14 May, CINCPAC and 
USSAG/7AF were tasked by the Acting Chairman, following an NSC 
meeting, to make preparations to seize the MAYAGUEZ, occupy Kaoh 
Tang Island, conduct B-52 strikes against the port of Kompong Som and 
Ream Airfield, sink all Cambodian small craft in target SEA.  Preparations 
were to be completed in time for execution early on 15 May.  The 
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USSAG/7AF concept plan to conduct these operations was received in 
Washington at 1330 hours on 14 May and approved, with minor 
modification, by CINCPAC.  The operational concept is attached at Tab C 
and subsequent events followed this scenario closely, with tactical air 
from the USS CORAL SEA being substituted for B-52’s in the attacks on 
the mainland. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1975)  
All of these objectives were accomplished, by 0025 EST on 15 May the crew had 
been recovered and returned to the Mayaguez and the Mayaguez was being towed by the 
USS Holt.  The response to use military force to recover the Mayaguez and crew can be 
viewed as a success from the perspective that at the end of the operation the crew and the 
vessel were recovered.  Although not knowing the exact location of the crew led to 
unnecessary operations on Kaoh Tang Island, one dedicated on-scene commander with 
clear objectives enabled forces to be leveraged in such a way that a successful 
interdiction of the pirated vessel was possible.  Additionally, the speed at which 
communications was able to flow enabled the U.S. to respond to the incident before the 
Khmer Rouge could decide its next step after taking the crew and the Mayaguez.   
 
Figure 5.   U.S. Marines maneuvering aboard the Mayaguez (From American Merchant 
Marine at War, 2000) 
3. The Achille Lauro 
The Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) attacked the Achille Lauro in 1985; this 
attack serves as an example of the disastrous consequences of a crisis situation at sea 
where the command and control process breaks down, complicated by the necessity to 
coordinate with foreign nations.  The capture of the Achille Lauro was unique in that the 
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ransom demanded by the PLF was “political prisoners.”  It is a valid case study, however, 
given that regardless of the demands, four armed men took a ship to ransom passengers 
and crew.  The Achille Lauro was boarded and taken on 7 October 1985 by four armed 
members of the aforementioned PLF.  Notification of the attack came when the PLF 
members issued their initial demands to the Italian government.  The response by the 
United States shows the quantum leap in technology between the Barbary wars and 1985.  
By the time night fell on Washington, D.C.,  
Groups consisting largely of top brass who had handled the TWA 
hijacking were being hastily convened in Washington, with lines of 
communication to President Reagan. An emergency team of experts in 
counter-terrorism and communications was sent to Rome to advise the 
U.S. ambassador there. Special forces (the Delta Force) were sent on their 
way from their base in North Carolina to a NATO airbase in Sicily.  
(BBC, 2002)   
Meanwhile, the Italian government was drawing up plans for a response in 
parallel but independent of U.S. plans, the Achille Lauro being Italian flagged gave 
authority to retake the ship to the Italian government.  Upon learning that passenger Leon 
Klinghofer, an American citizen on a wheelchair, was thrown overboard to his death, 
President Ronald Reagan changed the overall tack for responding to the incident, from 
one of observation to planning for direct action.  Despite modern satellite surveillance 
techniques, no system for reporting incidents of piracy at sea had been developed to 
allow tracking of the Achille Lauro. The ship went completely undetected until an Israeli 
patrol boat stumbled upon her and reported her position to the U.S.   
From then on the Achille Lauro was followed by three vessels of the U.S. 
navy in a position to launch an attack. U.S. diplomats in Rome and Cairo 
were trying to avoid negotiations with the PLF and keep the ship outside 
Egyptian territorial waters. But the Egyptian government was happy to 
allow her to enter its waters in spite of U.S. opposition. (BBC, 2002)   
Though Somalia does not have recognized territorial waters, forces operating in 
an anti-piracy role have largely respected the 12-nautical-mile buffer surrounding Somali 
shores.  This casts a brighter light on the legal precedence for prosecuting acts of piracy 
around the Horn of Africa. 
 20
 
Figure 6.   The Flight path of the PLO hostage takers  (Elliott, 2009) 
By 9 October 1985, the Achille Lauro was anchored in Port Said and the hijackers 
had agreed to hand over the hostages under the pretense that they would in turn be 
handed over to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to stand trial.  This angered 
the U.S., which to this point had not had to use any force to resolve the situation.  
However, the Egyptians wanted the PLF members out of the country and to be done with 
the whole ordeal, they wanted to fly the men to either Italy or the United States.  Yasser 
Arafat wanted the hijackers turned directly over to him.  While the plane was in the air, 
“F-14s from USS Saratoga (CV-60) intercepted an airliner bearing the men and forced 
the plane to land at a U.S. base in Sicily, where they were turned over to Italian 
authorities”  (Department of the Navy, 2000).  The U.S. Navy had many new high-speed 
tools in its maritime response tool kit. While the initial response to deploy forces to the 
scene and the information flow when forces had arrived moved quickly, technological 
advances played no large role in resolving the crisis.  Fortunately for all those aboard the 
Achille Lauro, the turnover of the ship and hostages was realized before an assault on the 
ship had to take place. 
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4. The Maersk Alabama 
Perhaps the most relevant incident of piracy in recent history is the case of the 
MAERSK Alabama.  The attack on the Alabama clearly demonstrates the willingness of 
Somali pirates to attack and hold U.S. flagged merchant ships.  The actions taken by the 
crew created unique aspects to the scenario but ultimately the attack resulted in the same 
hostage at sea situation that has become the modus operandi of pirates operating around 
the Horn of Africa.  The attack on the Alabama started on the 8 April 2009, but 
crewmembers actually report sighting two small boats at range of “two miles continuing 
to advance” the day before (Marine Officer, 2009). 
The sea-state prevented pirates from successfully attacking the Alabama on 7 
April; however, the seas were like glass on the eighth.  After several hours of attempting 
to evade the pirates, the container ship was overtaken by the pirates.  Once the pirates 
closed to one mile, Captain Phillips (the master of the Alabama) sounded the general 
alarm (Marine Officer, 2009).    
 
Figure 7.   Photo of pirates shortly before boarding 08 APR 2009 (From Marine Officer, 
2009) 
The Navy was notified of the situation late in the day on 8 April by the MAERSK 
Corporation (Weaver, 2009).  The Navy dispatched the USS Bainbridge in response.  The 
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Bainbridge, located some 300 nm from the site of the attack when first notified, reaches the 
Alabama at approximately 0300 local time on 9 April.  The Bainbridge arrived on the scene to 
find all four pirates and Captain Phillips in one of Alabama’s lifeboats.  A botched hostage 
exchange between the merchant crew and the pirates left the captain with food and water but 
still in the hands of four hostage takers.   
 
Figure 8.   The 28-foot lifeboat where Captain Richard Phillips and the four Somali 
pirates were held up, as seen from a U.S. Navy Scan Eagle UAV (From Weaver, 
2009). 
A wounded pirate was transferred to the USS Bainbridge. He then attempted to 
broker a deal between the remaining pirates and U.S. forces.  The lifeboat was then taken 
under tow by Bainbridge.  The Commanding Officer of Bainbridge had been given 
permission to use deadly force if Captain Phillips was deemed to be in imminent danger.  
Then on Sunday, 12 April 2009, U.S. Navy SEAL sharpshooters performed three 
simultaneous shots, killing the three pirates on the lifeboat instantly (Marine Officer, 
2009).  Similar to Decatur’s actions on the authority of the president, the actions on the 
part of the Bainbridge’s Commanding Officer is a modern-day example of a lower-level 
commander carrying out his commander’s intent to counter an act of piracy. 
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C. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PIRACY 
1. Pirates At Sea, Patriots At Home 
The dynamic of modern piracy has changed.  Before, strong regional powers stole 
from foreign countries that were so far away they seemed powerless to upset the status 
quo; now, local thugs steal in an attempt to force the economies of the world’s most 
powerful nations to bend to their will. The political climate in the central region of 
Somalia lends itself well to piracy, a partition with one of the leaders referring to 
international forces as “a ‘bunch of amateur tourists’ who, by systematically conceding to 
the pirates’ blackmail, are supporting their flourishing industry” (Quérouil, 2008).  
During the blockade and standoff with Motor Vessel Faina, local leaders proposed the 
idea of simply bombing the ship and neutralizing both the pirates and its military cargo.  
This idea did not appeal to the international community, given the civilian crew still 
being held aboard the ship.  This fundamental difference in approaches highlights just 
some of the cultural differences in the parties involved.  
It is often argued that the solution to piracy will be found on land, through sorting 
out the political mess that has kept Somalia in turmoil for nearly 20 years (Bahadur, 
2009).  This means that simply landing forces and dispensing of the pirates in their 
havens may rid the Somali coast of its current threat but does little to solve the problem 
in the long term.  As pirate successes mount, the pirate gangs become more entrenched in 
Somali society.  As the reigning local entities, they have the money and power to feed 
and protect the local populous.  The pirates are running local convenience stores, and 
mothers campaign to marry their daughters to pirate gang leaders—a crude yet lucrative 
stock exchange that trades in all the commodities required to send the pirates out on their 
missions.  The pirates claim they are the “Savior[s] of the Sea” (Bahadur, 2009). As 
Somalia languishes in political and economic turmoil, few people living in Somalia can 
refute this claim.     
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2. Actors 
It is important to know and attempt to understand the actors involved in modern 
day piracy; this understanding can offer solutions to piracy problem beyond responding 
to individual criminal acts that cost the global maritime trade billions of dollars annually.  
There are two schools of thought regarding the organization of Somali pirates; the first 
being one interconnected network of pirates committing coordinated attacks throughout 
the Gulf of Aden.  The second school of thought is three regionally bound networks of 
locally controlled pirates projecting their sea-power from their northern, central and 
southern “pirate havens.”  Given the lack of infrastructure and the nomadic tendencies of 
the indigenous people, the authors of this thesis will proceed under the assumption that 
the three Somali pirate clans operate independent of each other. 
The Northern clan is headquartered in the town of Eyl, pirates cruise the streets of 
Eyl and neighboring Garowe in new 4x4s and live in the relative lap of luxury.  Jay 
Bahadur, a reporter from the Times of London, had the opportunity to interview Boyah, a 
man who claims to be the leader of the Northern Pirate clan.  Boyah is one of the “Old 
Boys,” a group of men who were raiding merchant ships long before Somalian piracy 
was the glamorous trade it is today.  When asked by Bahadur whether or not Boyah 
considered himself a “burcad badeed” an “ocean robber,” Boyah clarified that he was in 
fact a political “Savior of the Sea.”  Boyah further jokes that he is the Chief of the local 
Coast Guard.  Though Boyah does seem to understand that what he is doing is wrong, he 
says the solution to the piracy situation lies in the hands of the international community 
and its efforts to restore the fishing grounds off the Somali coast.   
He claims that the targets he and his men strike are “a legitimate form of taxation 
levied in abstentia on behalf of a defunct government that he represents in spirit, if not in 
law” (Bahadur, 2009).  Boyah’s business model seems to be working; he claims to have 
received $800,000 in ransom for a single target (Bahadur, 2009).  Further, he claims to 
have 500 men working in the loose federation that is his pirate clan.  He claims to be the 
clan’s chief organizer, recruiter, financer and mission commander.  Boyah claims that 
everyone who seeks the position of pirate must see him and swear allegiance until death, 
natural or otherwise.  This leads to low turnover within the group. 
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Boyah estimates that roughly 20–30% of attacks are successful—not a very high 
success rate when Boyah himself admits his group targets anything that looks promising.  
Given the quality of life in Somalia, the relative fortunes doled out by insurance 
companies, and the development of a pirate commodities stock exchange, the modest 
success rate more than pays for the pirate’s failures. Once a ship is captured: 
(It is) steered to Eyl, where guards and interpreters are brought to look 
after the hostages during the ransom negotiation. Once secured, the 
money—often routed through banks in London and Dubai and parachuted 
directly on to the deck of the ship—is split: half goes to the hijackers, a 
third to the investors who fronted cash for the ships and weapons, and 20 
per cent to everyone else, from the guards to the translators (occasionally 
high school students on a summer break). Some money is also given as 
charity to the local poor. (Bahadur, 2009)   
This has given Boyah the appearances of being a modern-day Robin Hood.   
When Bahadur pressed Boyah about the training and techniques employed by his 
clan, he eventually admitted that many of his men were at one time Somali Coast Guard 
recruits.  Somalia attempted in 1999 to establish an official Coast Guard to protect 
fisheries whose depletion had driven Boyah and many like him to a life of piracy.  The 
official Coast Guard, however, soon broke down into gun-for-hire protection of local 
fishermen.  When this system of “protection” broke down, a new generation of better 
trained pirates with more sophisticated weapons appeared (Bahadur, 2009). 
In 2008, Manon Quérouil a freelance journalist, had the opportunity to interview 
Abdul Hassan the 39-year-old purported leader of the central region pirate clan leader.  
This clan goes by the name the “Central Region Coast Guard” (Quérouil, 2008) and 
operates out of the central city of Hobyo.  The relatively young group was formed only 
three years ago, yet has attacked some 29 ships and received an estimate ten million U.S. 
dollars in ransom.  Abdul Hassan claimed in his interview to have personally received 
$350,000 for his work.  The relative opulence of these pirate successes is not hard to find 
in the city of Hobyo.    
The Central Region Coast Guard claims to employ 350 men and operate over 100 
speed boats.  Hassan claims his men are a mix of former fishermen and disenchanted 
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militiamen.  Hassan says that he himself was in fact a legitimate fisherman only a few 
years ago.  He, much like his comrades in the North, attributes the drive to piracy to the 
overfishing of Somali waters by commercial fishermen. 
The techniques of the pirates operating out of the central region of Somalia 
practice some of the most advanced pirate techniques.  They often deploy their high-
speed boats from larger mother ships, the entire attack may take as little as 15 minutes 
(Quérouil, 2008).  The pirates also show their technical and navigation savvy by 
employing GPS to coordinate multi-boat attacks on their targets. 
Harardhere is the homeport to the southern clan of pirates which also believe they 
are Coastguardsmen.  Located 180 miles north of Mogadishu, Harardhere has always 
maintained a rough reputation.  The popular saying in Somalia is “When in Mogadishu 
you have to earn your money, when in Harardhere just use guns” (Mojon, 2009).  It is no 
surprise, then, that Harardhere is considered to be the birthplace of modern piracy.  Stig 
Jarle Hansen a Norwegian researcher explains “Harardhere provided the perfect base for 
the pirates as it was far away from the fractions in the Somali civil war” (Mojon, 2009).  
This was important because it meant that the money Abdi took from ransom was his and 
his men’s without having to pay tribute to local militias. 
Though these clans claim to be small regionally bound entities their tactics seem 
to mirror one another.  Whether this can be attributed to the training of the now defunct 
Somali Coast Guard or merely the identification of soft targets is a matter for future 
study.  What is relevant, however, is that the attacks that make the evening news are not 
necessarily reflective of the majority of pirate operations in the Gulf of Aden.   
3. Piracy as a Business Model 
The business model for Somali piracy was established by Mohammed Abdi back 
in 2003–2004.  Abdi was no sailor; he was (then) a mere bandit.  He was educated in his 
seafaring trade by underlings he hired to help him. Abdi has, however, come a long way 
in five years.  He has earned a spot on a UN watch list for violation of weapons 
embargoes.  It is also rumored that he was briefly a member of al Qaeda and was seen at 
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a celebration in Libya marking Moamer Gathafi’s 40 years in power.  The Union of 
Islamic Courts even tried to have him hanged but failed when they were ousted in 2006. 
  The pirates have begun to use their newfound fortunes (estimated to be in the 
tens of millions of dollars (Ahmed, 2009) to create a stock exchange to fund future pirate 
operations.  So far, this type of investing is contained to Harardhere.  The investors are 
not limited to those who take to the sea themselves.  It seems the “market” is a response 
to managing the investment of Somalis looking to earn money from piracy without 
having to commit the act. 
One man named “Mohamed” claimed to be at least part of the creative force 
behind the stock exchange.  Mohamed, a former pirate claims to support “72 ventures in 
the market and 10 which were successful” (Ahmed, 2009).  He also said “The shares are 
open to all and everybody can take part, whether personally at sea or on land by 
providing cash, weapons or useful materials ... we’ve made piracy a community activity” 
(Ahmed, 2009).  The stock exchange has become the center of Harardhere life not only to 
investors, but also to the sobbing family members inquiring, asking about news of 
missing loved ones who took to the sea. 
While both pirates and equipment are lost at sea every week, investors are not 
deterred.  This is due in large part to the dramatic increase in ransoms paid; ransoms have 
risen from $2–3 million U.S. dollars to greater than $4 million U.S. dollars (Ahmed, 
2009); the increased demand promises many willing investors great returns on future 
ventures.  One such investor is Sahra Ibrahim. She is a 22-year-old divorcee who bought 
a share in an attack on a Spanish tuna trawler.  Her investment was a Rocket Propelled 
Grenade she received as part of her alimony.  The return on this simple investment was 





D. THE EFFECT OF MODERN PIRACY 
1. Which Ships Are at the Greatest Risk? 
Although large container ships, and those carrying vast military cargoes, rise to 
prominence once taken, it is the smaller ships, on the order of less than 1000 Gross 
Registered Tons (GRT), that are statistically at the most risk.  Ships either anchored or 
moored pier-side are also among the pirates’ favored targets (Murphy, 2009). This is for 
the obvious reason that a stationary ship is easier to board. In an Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) study, attacks on moored ships were successful 90% of the time while 
attacks on ships underway were successful only 62% (Murphy, 2009).    
Ships are still at risk while underway however, the most common method of 
attack is a small, fast, highly maneuverable boat approaching the target’s stern.  In some 
cases this is preceded by other similar boat harassing the forward portion of the target 
ship and distracting the bridge watch-standers.  This harassment can come in many 
forms, ranging from the small boats crossing bow wakes to AK 47 staccatos and RPG fire 
at the target’s wheelhouse.  These methods are far superior to the fire axes and flaked out 
hoses that seem to have become the universal anti-piracy tactic.  Larger merchant ship 
can afford more advanced security systems that include electrified railings and security 
doors that are controlled by electronic locks.  These systems do little however for small 
merchant and fishing vessels who find themselves at the greatest risk anyway.  Due to 
insurance policy stipulations and restrictions of ports on ships that enter make the 
carrying of fire arms for use in self defense all but impossible (Murphy, 2009). 
2. Pirates or Hostage Takers and Their Indirect Victims 
One of the most interesting aspects of Somali piracy is the taking of crews.  This 
is nearly unique to Somalia (Ploch, 2008).  This would almost constitute sea kidnapping 
more than true piracy.  This does bode well for those taken by Somali pirates; there have 
been no wanton displays of violence against those captured.  The pirates benefit two-fold 
from this approach, they benefit in that they are more likely to receive higher ransom for 
unharmed hostages.  The pirates further benefit in that they avoid (with few exceptions) 
violent confrontation with coalition navies. 
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The long term impact of piracy is difficult to measure.  In a report to Congress on 
4 February 2009 Peter Chalk a senior representative of the Rand Corporation estimated 
that the annual cost of piracy to the maritime industry ranged from one to 16 billion 
dollars.  The maritime underwriters Lloyd’s of London have designated the Gulf of Aden 
a “War risk zone” (Ploch, 2008).  This can raise the premium paid by companies from 10 
to 20 thousand dollars per trip through the gulf.  London based firms have shown a 
willingness to pay smaller ransoms on the order of $500,000 up to $2 million USD 
(Ploch, 2008). Ransoms higher than that are not paid and typically negotiated down.  
Fortunately this does not hold true for the tiny American Merchant Marine, insurance 
premiums have not gone up due to the infrequency of attacks on U.S. shipping.  Shipping 
companies must now weigh the risks of piracy against the added cost of changing the 
shipping route to avoid the threat.  While thousands of ships choose to risk pirate attack 
every year, the Suez Canal authority has noted a decrease in traffic over 2008 which they 
directly attribute to piracy. 
International commerce is not the only victim of Piracy.  There are an estimated 
5 million Ethiopians dependant on Humanitarian Assistance (Ploch, 2008).  The United 
States spent $600 million on humanitarian aide to Ethiopia in 2008.  This presents low 
hanging fruit for the pirates.  Pirates can both ransom the crew as well as move the cargo 
ashore, feed their pirate towns and sell what they do not consume.  The piracy threat, 
along with an increase in fuel and shipping prices, has hampered efforts to get aide to the 
region. 
3. The Response 
The international response to piracy has been varied.  The European Union started 
Operation ATALANTA, as a direct response to the attacks on WFP ships.  Forces 
assigned to ATALANTA are tasked to escort merchant ships and are authorized use of 
force to deter pirates.  This operation is the first under the framework of the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and will involve over twenty ships and 1,800 
personnel.  Since the start of Operation ATALANTA, the EU has also opened the 
Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA).  The MSC-HOA is voluntary 
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information exchange where ships transiting the area can provide and receive information 
as well as coordinate with ATALANTA forces in the area (Ploch, 2008). 
The United States’ response to the modern pirate threat was the creation of 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151.  CTF 151 is the first force designated for the sole 
purpose of combating piracy off the Horn of Africa (Ploch, 2008).  Prior to the creation 
of CTF 151, CTF 150 created a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA).  This Area 
created safer shipping routes for merchant vessels attempting to cross the Gulf of Aden. 
Within the MSPA lies Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors (IRTC), all U.S. 
shipping has been directed to plan their passages using the IRTCs.  IRTCs are credited 
for the reduction of successful pirate attacks (Ploch, 2008).  The IRTCs are not a panacea 
however.  The incident involving the MAERSK Alabama is definitive proof both that not 
every ship instructed to follow the IRTC does so, as well as the implications of ships that 
do not following them.  CTF 151 forces are coordinated through NAVCENT 
headquartered in Bahrain. 
In 2008, NATO has also coordinated a response in the form of Operation Sea 
Shield.  Sea Shield was a coordinated escort system that would last roughly a year.  In 
2009 Operation Allied Protector was launched.  Allied protector is commanded by the 
Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG).  Operation Allied Protector’s mission was to 
deter and defend against piracy off the Horn of Africa.  In the Second half of 2009 the 
mission of Allied Protector was expanded to coordinating with local governments for 
piracy prevention (Ploch, 2008).   
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is an organization overseeing the 
commercial shipping industry, based out of London the IMO’s “main task has been to 
develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping and its remit 
today includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, 
maritime security and the efficiency of shipping.” (International Maritime Bureau, 2010). 
As stated the IMO is the organization responsible for the reporting of incidents of piracy 
involving merchant ships.  IMO regulation XI-2/6.6 states,  
The Committee noted that SOLAS regulation XI-2/6.6 requires that an 
Administration receiving notification of a ship security alert shall notify 
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the States in the vicinity of which the ship is presently operating. The 
Committee confirmed that the appropriate recipient for such information is 
the national point of contact as required by SOLAS regulation XI-2/7.2, as 
notified to, and promulgated by, the Organization in accordance with 
SOLAS regulation XI-2/13.1.5. Where the State(s) in the vicinity of the 
ship are non-Contracting parties to SOLAS, such information should be 
passed via normal diplomatic channels in the most expedient manner.  
(International Maritime Bureau, 2010) 
While this direction is important in legal terms, the “Administration receiving 
notification of a ship security alert” has discretion as to whom they report to.  Were the 
“Administration” directed to report to the MOC itself significant time savings could be 
realized.  SSAS is a technology easily enveloped into the current Navy MOC architecture 
that if implemented may speed up the time it takes for a competent agent to respond to an 
incident of piracy.   
The SSAS box works as a discrete way to notify individuals of a pirate or terrorist 
act upon a vessel.  A box is installed on the ship, usually the bridge area and in the event 
of an attack an alarm button can be pressed that sends a distress signal, other alarms can 
be installed in the Engine Operating Space as well as the Master’s cabin  (Wireless, 
2009).  The distress signal is usually sent in the form of an e-mail via INMARSAT or 
Iridium or through SMS messages.  SSAS alerts can be delivered through a variety of 
means.  Information is delivered through transmittal of a ship-to-shore security alert via 
HF radio, satellite, and/or GSM phone to a competent authority designated as by the 
company i.e., existing DoD and DoN network architectures. The system uses the ship's 
existing communication systems and connects the alert terminals to the Ethernet on the 
vessel as with any other digital device.  
Current architectures closely guard information through a robust private satellite 
network, while ensuring reliable service around the globe.  These satellite network 
categories are generally divided between the INMARSAT satellite network, and the 
Iridium satellite network.  The Iridium network consists of 66 Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
satellites that have the ability to provide global coverage including the North and South 
Poles.  The downside however to the LEO configuration lies in the possible gaps in 
coverage.  LEO satellites provide 8 to 10 minutes of coverage before connection with the 
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satellite is lost.  The INMARSAT network relies on a Geo-synchronous orbit (GEO) 
offering global coverage while requiring only three satellites regardless of longitude.   
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN PIRACY 
1. Overview 
As more merchant shipping is taken by Somali pirates the opportunity arises to 
study how rapid accurate notification of incidents of piracy can improve the command 
and control process.  As information is the lifeblood of the command and control system 
it is imperative to report accurately and timely incidents to the appropriate authority such 
that the responding force is on scene before pirates have had an opportunity to board but 
at a minimum before crew and vessel have been taken back to pirate havens along the 
Somali coast.  This information is of particular interest to the U.S. Navy which, due to its 
capabilities and presence, is often called to respond to incidents of piracy.  As the Navy’s 
numbered fleets stand up Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), consideration should be 
given to how information regarding emergent or crises situations at sea is received and 
processed at the MOCs.  Again, using piracy as the example of an emergent situation at 
sea this research aims to test various organizational structures and reporting procedures of 
incidents of piracy and explore how those incidents are managed.   
2. Pirate Command and Control Structures 
Part of being able to dictate the pace and direction of operations is the ability to 
move quickly and accurately through the steps of the OODA loop directing one’s own 
forces but also  by simultaneously working to disrupt the OODA loop of an adversary. 
The same is true of Somali pirates.  The best way of helping to disrupt their OODA loop 
in the pursuit of merchant vessels is to understand their command and control and 
command and control system.  This helps to identify areas of weakness for exploitation 
and to gain perspective on areas of how Somali pirates organize forces and control them 
when executing a mission.   
A command and control system (C2 System) consists of, “the facilities, 
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for 
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planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions 
assigned” (Department of the Navy, 2008).  The first element essential to Somali pirates 
C2 systems are people.  Although their organizations are not explicitly known, Somali 
pirate gangs are formed along clan lines and recruit personnel primarily from three 
groups.  The three groups are ex-fishermen, former militiamen, and technically savvy 
individuals  (Hunter, 2008). Ex-fishermen provide the requisite maritime knowledge to 
include ship handling and navigation.  Ex-militiamen provide the muscle and weapons 
knowledge required for boarding’s and guarding of hostages.  Technical experts provide 
the know-how to operate commercially available technology such as satellite phones, 
GPS, laptops, and various pieces of military hardware that require technical acumen.  
These three groups comprise the core of personnel necessary for pirate operations and of 
the C2 system; however, there are additional personnel essential to operations.  This  
includes finance personnel, negotiators, cooks and care takers for hostages and weapons 
procurement personnel  (Hunter, 2008).  Pirate organizations additionally have a ready 
pool of recruits from young disaffected Somali youth that with little hope for 
employment will easily turn to piracy to secure a living.   
The facilities that pirates require as part of their C2 system are first and foremost 
the ports from which they operate out of.  Ports in Somalia that have been identified as 
havens for pirate gangs are Eyl, Haradhere, Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, Hobyo, 
Mogadishu, and Garad  (Ploch, 2008). Within these ports the pirates rely on facilities for 
shelter, food, and buildings to keep hostages.  A key characteristic shared by these port 
cities that make them advantageous for pirate gangs to be based at is they are strongly 
armed, have sympathetic populations, and are in areas beyond the control of the local 
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  The map depicted below shows the 
ports that have significant pirate activity. 
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Figure 9.   Port towns of Somalia and Puntland.  (From Ploch, 2008) 
A variety of equipment makes up the Somali pirate C2 system.  The main pieces 
of equipment are the boats and weapons they employ when attempting to board a 
merchant vessel.  Pirates operate 20-foot-long fiberglass hulled skiffs.  These skiffs are 
powered by one or in some cases two outboard motors ranging in horsepower from 85 to 
150 horsepower.  For operations involving greater range pirates use pirated fishing 
trawlers or dhows, also named mother ships, which can hold more supplies and personnel 
than the smaller skiffs.  Skiffs are also tied up alongside mother ships (International 
Expert Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2008).  This equipment combines to 
provide the pirates with a versatile platform for operations on the high seas.  For 
boardings of merchant vessels pirates use ladders, grappling hooks and rope as well as 
GPS navigation systems to fix positions of merchant ships and coordinate assets.   
Communications allows for critical information to flow for an organization within 
the C2 System.  The pirates communicate through a variety of means.  The pirates use 
satellite phones to communicate with each other as well as when negotiating ransom 
demands to organizations trying to pay ransom to the pirates in exchange for hostages  
(International Expert Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2008).  Pirates use 
laptops for business transactions and therefore it is possible they utilize such applications 
as email and chat to communicate as well.  Additionally when conducting an attack on a 
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merchant vessel with two or more skiffs pirates may use line of sight handheld radios to 
communicate at the tactical level.  In port towns pirates may use messengers delivering 
oral or written directions.  Pirates also use successfully hijacked vessels onboard 
communications systems to conduct ransom negotiations (International Expert Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2008).      
The procedures that allow the pirate gang to prosecute merchant shipping for 
hijacking and ransom are not exactly known.  While tactics have been observed on how 
they board vessels it is unclear as to who gives the orders to attempt a hijacking.  
Although it is an issue of much debate, “there are also reports of pirates being equipped 
with GPS and tracking ships through the use of on board navigation information systems. 
They are also believed to have built up a large network of coastal and port informers who 
are able to pass on relevant information to them when required”  (International Expert 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2008).  Such procedures help to direct pirates 
at sea close to a targeted merchant vessel and give pirate group leaders the ability to plan 
in advance as opposed to early tactics which involved loitering at sea until a suitable 
target passed by.   
The items involved in the Somali Pirate C2 system described individual pieces 
that make up form two elements of a C2 System.  The first element is the personnel and 
the second element is the facilities, equipment, communications and procedures 
collectively.  These elements are, “…essential to a commander for planning, directing, 
and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned” (CJCS, 
1995). 
F. WHY HAS THIS PROBLEM NOT BEEN SOLVED? 
A look at U.S. response to incidents of piracy throughout history can lead to 
discoveries of what made for successful intervention or led to disaster on the high seas.  
In all of the examples highlighted by this research they all received presidential attention 
to the issue.  The presidential attention for each issue also meant that the Office of the 
President was ultimately responsible for dictating to military forces what action the U.S. 
would take.  This process running its course all the way to the highest level of U.S. 
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decision making adds a considerable amount of time to responding to singular acts of 
piracy.  The dissemination of clear concise commander’s intent would allow for lower 
level commander’s to position their forces to exploit many of the advantages Decatur 
benefited from in the early 19th century.     
The evolution of communications flow allows for the U.S. to now respond to 
singular incidents of piracy.  At the time of the Edwin incident, which due to much U.S. 
public outcry led to the deployment of Decatur and his Mediterranean Squadron, 
communications moved at the speed of sail at sea or by foot or horseback on land.  The 
U.S. therefore could do little to respond to one incident in piracy but had to deal with the 
culmination of incidents.  The actions of the Decatur’s squadron were a response to the 
pirate threat in Mediterranean waters not the taking of the Edwin.  As long range radio 
communications and later satellite communications came into existence the U.S. was able 
to be notified of a singular incident quickly.  Response could happen quickly depending 
on the proximity of U.S. forces.  This meant that while attempting to deal with many of 
the socio economic issues on land that allow for piracy to flourish the U.S. could still 
affect positive outcomes of individuals taken at sea.   
Modern day merchants have an established pattern of paying ransom to pirates 
similar to the practices of American merchant shipping prior to President Madison 
dispatching Decatur to the Mediterranean for the second time.  The paying of ransoms 
did not work at this time and is not working in present day Somalia as piracy is becoming 
more and more established and expanding to an international business.  Unlike the early 
situation in the Mediterranean where there was not a USN presence, today in the Indian 
Ocean and GOA the USN patrols these waters ready to respond to an incident of piracy.  
Effective organizational structure and reporting of incidents of piracy between 
commercial shipping companies and the USN must be critically examined to allow the 
USN a chance to respond to and plan for incidents of piracy where force is necessary to 
take back the ship. 
The Achille Lauro incident and the Alabama incident saw the utilization of U.S. 
special operations forces.  These responses while successful can tie up assets that could 
be utilized elsewhere in response to other crises.  In all of the examples the on-scene 
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commander had clear commander’s intent from higher authority, be it the Secretary of the 
Navy or the President.  Additionally, the on-scene commander had permission to use 
deadly force if needed as was the case with the Maersk Alabama situation.  The focus of 
these efforts to this point has been on the physical response to piracy.  This thesis hopes 
to shed some light on possible improvements in the reporting process to bring about a 
quicker response by the U.S. government and coalition partners.    
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. WHY POW-ER 
POW-ER is a well established computational model in the academic field with its 
development at Stanford as a part of the collaborative Virtual Design Team.  The Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration has 
sponsored initiatives regarding POW-ER.  POW-ER was chosen for this thesis to model 
reporting, coordination, planning and decision to allocate forces for an incident of piracy. 
Current methods are modeled in the ‘As Is’ scenario. The proposed benefits of the SSAS 
model can be seen in the results of the experiment using the ‘To Be’ scenario.  POW-ER 
modeling software has been accepted in the academic community having been developed 
at Stanford and utilized heavily at the Naval Postgraduate School to model edge 
organizations as well as various commercial entities.    POW-ER is a concise way to gain 
qualitative data to help solve decision making problems about the structure of an 
organization.     
1. History of POW-ER 
The Virtual Design Team (VDT) research group was initiated at Stanford in the 
late 1980s to, “…help managers design organizations and work processes for executing 
fast-track development of complex products without incurring the large cost overruns and 
catastrophic quality failures that had frequently plagued such efforts”  (Leavitt, 1965). 
The VDT simulation system is a computational model of project organizations, the first 
commercial implementation of the VDT software was introduced in 1996 known as 
SimVision (Leavitt R. E., 2009).  VDT has limitations in trying to model edge 
organizations and requires models to have, “…a defined beginning and end, predefined 
sequences of tasks with estimable amounts of direct work, and predetermined actor task 
assignments” (Leavitt, 1965).  Despite these limitations the success of SimVision led to 
four later versions of VDT software, the fifth version known as VDT-5 was released as 
POW-ER 3.3 to the U.S. Navy.    
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Figure 10.    VDT Processing View of Knowledge Work (From Levitt, 1965). 
Due to these limitations POW-ER 2.0 was developed so behaviors such as 
knowledge flows, trust effects and cultural differences between team members within 
highly distributed organizations could be modeled in a research environment.  
Additionally POW-ER can model, “…demand-driven, dynamic allocation of resources to 
tasks on an as-needed basis” (Leavitt, 1965). 
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Figure 11.   Sample POW-ER model (From Levitt, 1965) 
The above screen capture shows the graphical user interface for POWER in this 
case the model represents a simple Command and Control (C2) structure.  In the model 
actors, tasks, milestones, meetings, communication links and their relationships are 
represented.  POWER is capable of modeling tasks ranging in time from minutes to 
years.  The POWER platform is made up of a graphical model editor, simulation engine, 
and a charting and reporting module.  “The model editor provides the primary user 
interface to POW-ER. It allows for the construction of complex project models by 
dragging, dropping and connecting simple graphical objects representing actors, tasks, 
meetings, etc., along with the relationships between these objects. A property editor 
supports direct manipulation of the numeric and symbolic properties specific to each type 
of object. The model editor also supports automatic derivation of alternate versions of a 
model, supporting comparative analysis of related scenarios”  (Leavitt, 1965).  In order to 
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simulate the model POWER uses Monte Carlo techniques, the use of these techniques 
allows for a model of complex systems involving large numbers of actors.    
2.  Academic Justification 
Extensive testing has gone into POW-ER as a successor to VDT at the academic 
level.  As Dr. Raymond Levitt of Stanford University comments, POW-ER is going to be 
heavily utilized to model organizational structures.  With an ultimate goal of being able 
to, “…supply a robust organization design and planning tool that can be used by the 
wider C2 community to engage in sophisticated “what-if” analysis of real world 
situations” (Levitt, 1965).  
A thesis from June 2008, utilized POW-ER software to model Extended Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO) organization, data collection and information flow.  The 
Sundland Carroll thesis used POW-ER to model the current organizational structure for 
the way EMIO is conducted and then modeled a proposed organizational structure for 
EMIO operations designed to decrease the time to conduct the mission and process 
information  (Sundland, 2008).   
In 2006, this paper, “Computational Modeling and Analysis of Networked 
Organizational Planning in a Coalition Maritime Strike Environment” at the 2006 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The State of the Art and 
the State of the Practice.  This research begins with documenting the planning process 
associated with maritime tasking orders for a coalition expeditionary strike group.  The 
research is then used to build a model of the current maritime component commander 
organization and planning process using the POW-ER software.  Alternatives to this are 
explored and measured through the quantitative data generated by POW-ER  (Looney, 
2006).  
POW-ER has been discussed as being a cost effective way of gathering data on 
hypothesis before conducting costly and time consuming field experimentation.  “Clearly 
computational experimentation using tools such as POW-ER (e.g., Gateau et al. 2007) 
will continue to play a key role in research along these lines. It is very time-consuming 
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and expensive to grow an Edge organization in the field, but it is very quick and cheap to 
model and simulate one via computer”  (Barrett & Nissen, 2008).  
In looking to improve Navy response times to incidents of piracy through 
optimizing command and control relationships and information flows, POW-ER is 
capable of modeling the current organizational structure in place to respond to an incident 
of piracy.  The response to piracy involves coordination between the USN and a 
commercial entity in attempting to conduct a real world exercise involving these two 
organizations it may be difficult to bring both organizations together.  POW-ER is 
capable of bridging this gap and modeling the interaction between these two entities.  
Since POW-ER is capable of large numbers of replications statistical relevance is 
achieved yielding richer quantitative data.   
POW-ER allows replications for multiple C2 structures and compares the results 
side by side.  Attempting to do this through real life experimentation could be 
prohibitively expensive and time consuming for an organization if it were to participate 
in several different types of experiments aimed at modeling their command and control 
structure.  Research involving POW-ER has been sponsored by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for and Information Integration.  The research was for the 
Command and Control Research Program (CCRP).   The Navy has recognized the 
efficacy of using POW-ER to model existing and hypothetical C2 structures with specific 
examples of POW-ER being used to study command and control possibilities pertaining 
to the MOC.  As this thesis looks at part of the Navy MOC, it is valid to use POW-ER 
software to gather quantitative data to analyze the time it takes for the Navy to respond to 
an incident of piracy. 
B. IDENTIFYING POW-ER EXPERIMENT CONSTANT PROPERTIES 
1. Overview 
Many properties will remain constant through all experiments modeling the MOC 
anti-piracy operations, these constants are described through their properties and are 
broken down between Project, Case, and Position properties.  For the models generated 
using POW-ER the term “Property” or “Properties” is used in the place of “Attribute.”  
 44
Likewise, the term “Position” is used in place of the term “Actor.”  Position properties 
will not change between experiments to simulate the same people conducting varied tasks 
as the MOC architecture changes.   
The term “Project” refers to the model as a whole, while a “Case” is a specific 
configuration within a model.  In this case both the “As Is” and “To Be” are two cases of 
the same project.  Project and Case properties are those that apply to the whole 
architecture and will remain constant through all the experiments. 
2. Project Properties 
These properties are universal between cases and did not differ between 
experiments.  The priority for this experiment is high due to the level of attention given to 
individual acts of piracy.  The work day is set to 1440 minutes to reflect the 24 hour 
workday of the MOC, likewise the workweek is set to 10,080 minutes to reflect the seven 
day workweek of the MOC. The team work experience is set to medium to allow for 
differences in ability between watch-standers.  Centralization of the MOC organization is 
set to low to show to reflect the individual efforts of the watch-stander.  Each watch-
stander’s contributions stand on their own and though the Course Of Action decision 
requires higher approval individual tasks assigned can be completed by the persons 
assigned.  Formalization for the experiment is set to high to reflect the structure of Pre-
Planned Responses, Rules Of Engagement and standing orders within the theater.  The 
Communication Probability is set to 00.85 to allow for gaps in communication due to 
watch turnovers and human error.  The Noise probability is set to 00.01 assuming there is 
a 1% chance of noise cancelling out communication.  Functional Exception Probability is 
set to 00.01 because of an assumed very low probability that the tasks assigned would be 
beyond the capabilities of those assigned to the task.  The Project Exception Probability 
and the Institution Exception Probability are set to 00.01 assuming a very low probability 
of interface problems between tasks.      
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Figure 12.   Project Properties for all MOC experiments 
3. Case Properties 
The case properties will not change between the cases as the name would imply.  
Keeping these values constant demonstrates their role as independent variables in the 
experiment.  The start date for both cases is 01 April 2010.  The seed value is 0 to run a 
truly random simulation for 10,000 trials.  The Actor-Model is set to Generic and Skill-
Model is set to Static so they will not bias the results of the experiment.   
 




4. Position Properties 
These properties will be described by role but will be constants through all the 
experiments. The Culture of the position can be defined as Generic, Japanese or 
American, for this series of experiments the culture will be set to American for all 
positions.  The role of the Position can be defined as a Project Manager (PM) the highest 
level decision maker, a Subteam Lead (SL) the decision maker subordinate only to the 
PM, or a Subteam Member (ST) who is merely a worker.  The Full Time Equivalent 
(FTE) is the amount (represented by percent) of attention a task is given by a position.  
The Application Experience describes the experience of the person(s) filling a position.  
Cultural Experience marries the culture of the person in the position with the 
organization’s design, for all runs the Cultural Experience will be set to medium.  Salary 
is not a motivator for the positions and is set at the default 50.0 for all runs.  The skill 
ratings will remain at their default settings with no setting changes.   
To explain the statistical probability of supervisory agents becoming involved in 
direct support of tasks not completed, consider two independent tasks, Task A and Task 
B.  A supervisor must take remedial action if one or both tasks fail.  So, what is the 
probability that Task A fails OR task B?  It is the complement of the probability that Task 
A AND Task B are successful.  
  
P(Task A fails) = 0.01 
P (Task A succeeds) = 1- 0.01 = 0.99 
  
P(B fails) = 0.01 
P(B succeeds) = 0.99 
  
P(A AND B succeeds) = P(A success) * P (B success) = (0.99)^2 




Figure 14.   MOC position Construct  
a. U.S. Government   
The position titled U.S. Government is not meant to represent one 
individual person but the collective efforts of all those involved in responding to an act of 
piracy above the level of NAVCENT.  The role for this position is set as PM.  The 
Application Experience is set to medium to allow for the “quality spread” among all the 
persons involved.  The FTE for the U.S. Government has been set to 00.6 to reflect the 
attention given by a hegemonic government that cannot focus all its efforts on one task.  
Given the number of tiers between the U.S.G position and the IW/ISE/COPS positions 
and the Functional Exception Probability of 00.01, there is a 0.01x 2.989-7 (2.989-7 is 
based on the probability of failure by lower-level position to complete a task) or 2.989-9 
chance that the USG position would have to directly solve any tasks not handled by any 
of the lower level positions given a Functional Exception Probability of 0.01. The 
Functional Exception Probability can be manipulated (set higher or lower) within the 
model to emulate the decision making characteristics/personality of a specific USG 
element/leader.    
b. NAVCENT 
The NAVCENT role represents both the decision maker and his staff.  The 
position is given the Role of SL with NAVCENT being the decision maker subordinate to 
the USG but responsible for the Course of Action decision.  The Application Experience 
is set to medium due to the counter-piracy planning and action being one of many 
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warfare areas for which NAVCENT is responsible.  The FTE is set to 00.8 due to the 
priority of planning contingencies to the piracy scenario among the staff while not losing 
the commander’s focus on the remainder of the theater.  The Functional Exception 
Probability for this experiment leaves the NAVCENT commander and staff with a (0.01 
x 0.00002989) or 2.989-7 chance of having to directly solve a task assigned to either the 
MIOC or the FCC.   
c. 5th FLT 
The 5th Fleet position represents the 5th Fleet commander and staff.  This 
position is given the role of Subteam member to account for the 5th Fleet’s responsibility 
for the MOC while being responsible to NAVCENT.  The Application Experience is set 
to medium. The FTE for 5th Fleet has been set to .80 to reflect the level of attention 
required by the numbered fleet commander.  The 5th Fleet position has a (0.01 x 
0.002989) or 0.00002989 chance of directly solving a task assigned to MOC positions 
based on a 0.01 chance of the 0.002989 chance lower echelon failure.         
d. MOC Director    
The MOC director represents the person assigned as the MOC director.  
The MOC director’s role is that of a Subteam Lead for the responsibility of those in the 
MOC.  The Application Experience is set to medium as there is no requirement for 
previous anti piracy experience when screened.  The FTE is set to .8 to show the attention 
given by the MOC Director to an incident with U.S. civilian mariners as hostages, using 
the join statistics method the MOC director has a [1-(1-.0199x0.01)(1-.012)] or 0.002989 
chance of becoming directly responsible for incomplete tasks performed by their 
subordinates.   
e. Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) 
The MIOC position serves as the person heading the Intelligence cell 
within the MOC.  This person is designated as a Subteam lead responsible for the 
Indications & Warnings position and the Intelligence Support Element position.  The 
Application Experience is set to medium and the FTE is set to 00.65 due to the high level 
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of intelligence data and information passing through the 5th Fleet area of operation not 
pertaining to piracy.  There is a (1-0.992) or 0.0199 chance that the MIOC position will 
have to complete a task assigned to the I/W or the ISE.  
f. Fleet Command Center (FCC) 
The FCC position represents the person assigned to run the Operations cell 
within the MOC.  The role is set to Subteam Lead responsible for the Current Operations 
position.  The FTE for the FCC position is set to 00.70 because of the Operations other 
than piracy that must be actively coordinated in the region.  The Fleet Command Center 
hold the same supervisory position as the MIOC, however due to the nature of the 
response planning for individual incidents of piracy the Current Operations (COPS) is the 
only position tasked beneath the FCC.  Given this, the FCC has a  0.012 or 1-4 chance of 
having to directly complete tasks assigned to COPS.  
g. Indications and Warnings (IW) 
The IW position represents the cell responsible for receipt, processing, 
initial analysis of and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence within the MIOC  
(Department of the Navy, 2008).  IW is also responsible for monitoring red and white 
shipping.  The role assigned to the IW position is Subteam member.  The FTE for this 
role is 0.90 due to the IW’s responsibility of initial analysis of the pirate attack.  The 
Functional Exception Probability of the IW position is set to 0.01 given the formal and 
on-the-job training prior to a watch-standers qualification, in other words there is a 1% 
chance the IW position would not be able to complete an assigned task.       
h. Intelligence Support Element (ISE) 
The ISE position represents the cell within the MIOC responsible for the 
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), Knowledge and 
Information Management (KIM), support for the commander’s assessment and IO  
(Department of the Navy, 2008).  ISE is assigned the role of Subteam member and is 
given an FTE of 0.65, ISE is given an FTE of 0.65 because it will continue to have other 
intelligence requirements throughout the region to various customers in the MOC and 
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therefore will not devote all available resources and time to an incident of piracy.  ISE 
also has a Functional Exception Probability of 0.01 due to the knowledge base within the 
cell. 
i. Current Operations (COPS) 
The COPS position represents the planning cell within the FCC 
responsible for ongoing and emergent operations.  The FTE is set to 0.85, assuming the 
planning of a response to an emergent act of piracy would consume 85% of the cell’s 
efforts.  The Functional Exception Probability results in a 1% chance the COPS team 
would not be able to complete an assigned task. 
j. Tactical Element 
The Tactical Element position represents a wide array of elements within 
the military from tier one Assets (e.g., Development Group) to a special operations 
capable Marine Expeditionary Unit.  The role of the Tactical Element is given the role of 
Subteam Leader. The FTE for this position is 1.0 because when tasked all the efforts of 
that specific element are focused on the anti piracy mission.  There is a 0.01 Functional 
Exception Probability for this position. 
k. Company Security Officer (CSO) 
The CSO position represents the shipping company that owns the victim 
ship down to the person within the company (CSO) that coordinates between that ship 
and the USG.  The culture of the interactions between the company and the USG will be 
defined as American for the role assignment.  The settings for organizational culture in 
POWER are American, Japanese or Generic.  Shipping companies are headquartered all 
over the world however to function in this organizational model the interface is 
inherently American.  The FTE of the CSO is set to 0.9 given the priority of managing 
ransom demands, employees held hostage and potentially lost cargo.   
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C. IDENTIFYING POW-ER EXPERIMENT VARIABLE PROPERTIES 
1. Overview 
The POW-ER Modeling software allows for the control of many variables.  These 
variables will change to reflect changes to the overall architecture being modeled.  These 
variables will be identified as Task, Assignment and Branch properties.  Task properties 
will change as the design of the MOC changes to incorporate new technologies (SSAS).  
Assignment properties will change with the changing tasks.  Branch properties will 
change to accommodate the time required to move from task to task as the MOC 
architecture changes to include SSAS.  
Experiment 1 for this thesis focused on the current command and control 
architecture for 5th Fleet Maritime Operations responding to an emergent act of piracy 
committed against a U.S. flagged merchant vessel.  Responsibility for the reporting of 
this incident to the U.S. Government (USG) falls on the commercial shipping interest 
represented by the company’s security officer.  This model hopes to emulate the sequence 
of events that occurred during the Maersk Alabama incident. 
2. Experiment Milestones 
Milestones in POW-ER are used to detail phases of completion for the work flow.  
The milestones for the experiment follow the phases of the commander’s decision cycle 
as delineated in the MOC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) NTTP 3-32.1.  Those 
milestones include “Monitor,” “Assess,” “Plan” and “Direct.”  “Monitor” marks the start 
of the experiment and includes all MOC operations prior to the incident of piracy.  The 
“Direct” milestone ends the experiment with the commander’s decision communicated.  
Events after the commander’s decision including logistical positioning and actions taken 
to physically counter the act of piracy securing the M/V ship and crew are not included in 
the model.  Definitions of the Milestones taken from NTTP 3-32.1 are included below. 
a. Monitor 
Monitoring involves measuring ongoing activities that may impact the 
operational area or impact ongoing or future operations. The baseline for this 
 52
measurement of the situation is the current plan or plans. This baseline allows the staff to 
measure the current situation against the one envisioned in the plan. This allows the 
commander and staff to identify where the current situation deviates from the one 
envisioned in the plan. Although staff sections monitor their individual staff functions to 
maintain current staff estimates, the preponderance of monitoring is conducted by the 
maritime intelligence operations center (MIOC), the Navy operations center, the logistics 
readiness center (LRC), and the communications and information center  (Department of 
the Navy, 2008). 
b. Assess 
Within the commander’s decision cycle, assessment is the determination 
of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Fundamental to 
assessment are judgments about progress in designated mission areas as measured against 
the expected progress in those same mission areas. These judgments allow the 
commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and 
serve as a catalyst for planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff 
to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission 
accomplishment. The maritime assessment group has formal responsibility for 
assessment, but all MOC organizational entities bear some level of responsibility to be 
alert to indications that things are not going according to plan and take appropriate action  
(Department of the Navy, 2008). 
c. Plan 
In the planning portion of the commander’s decision cycle, the 
commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or develop new plans with the 
purpose of successful completion of the broader mission. The preponderance of the 
planning function is conducted in either in future operations (FOPS) or the maritime 
planning group (MPG)  (Department of the Navy, 2008). 
 53
d. Direct 
The commander, through the MOC, directs actions to ensure that current 
orders and directives are completed as intended. This direction is done with the broader 
purpose of achieving the overall mission.  Tools like the commander’s intent and 
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) assist the MOC in this role. The 
preponderance of the directing function is conducted by Navy operations center and 
current operations (Department of the Navy, 2008). 
3. Experiment 1 Tasks 
For the purposes of POWER a task is defined by its properties.  The first property 
is the task name and the effort which is the duration of the task given a specified level of 
required skill.  Effort type for a task is the FTE.  Each task requires a required skill which 
will be left as the default setting of generic for this experiment.  This required skill 
reflects the ability of the average worker.  The learning days is set to zero implying there 
are no days required to learn the work, the assumption that everyone is qualified to have 
their job.  Each task has a priority which dictates which task takes precedence for actors 
that are assigned more than one task.  Task properties including ‘Requirement 
Complexity’, ‘Solution Complexity’ and ‘Uncertainty are set to the default of Medium 
for the purposes of both experiments.  There is a ‘Fixed Cost’ property of Zero, because 
financial considerations especially minimizing cost are not the concerns of the workers in 
the model.  This functionality is meant for private industry looking to minimize costs.  
The associated successor branches will be discussed with the task it affects.   The priority 
property of a task will not affect other tasks assigned to a position because tasks assigned 
are completed in series.  These tasks will start after the ‘Monitor’ milestone and is not 
concerned with current regional operations within the MOC outside the scope of piracy.  
These tasks will end when the ‘Direct’ milestone is achieved the physical counter piracy 
phase of the operation to include logistics positioning and support is beyond the scope of 
this model.         
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a. Attack Notification 
The name of this task is ‘Attack Notification’.  ‘Attack Notification’ is the 
first task in the ‘Monitor’ phase of the decision making cycle.  This task starts after a 
given 10 hour time lag between the start of the pirate attack and the shipping company’s 
notification.  This 10 hour time lag accounts for an average of two possible means of 
attack notification to the shipping company.  The first being the merchant vessel notifies 
the shipping company at the start of the attack marked by visual sighting of pirates 
following the ship.  An example of this is the case of the Maersk Alabama where the first 
sighting of the pirate vessels was the evening before a mid morning attack the next day.   
The case where a merchant vessel is surprised by a pirate attack and is therefore unable to 
notify the shipping company that the attack is occurring it would be the pirates who 
notify the shipping company with a list of demands.  The ‘Duration’ of the ‘Attack 
Notification’ is set to ten minutes accounting for the approximate length of the first 
communication with the shipping company.  The ‘Priority’ of this task is high.  This task 
is complete when the Company’s Security Officer (CSO) receives notification of the 
attack. 
b. Attack Verification       
The name of this task is ‘Attack Verification’.  This task is preceded by a 
1 hour time lag which accounts for an average time between the CSO being notified in 
the middle of the night away from work and during the day at work with all available 
resources to notify pertinent decision makers in the company.  The ‘Duration’ of this task 
is given a time of 1 hour to reflect an easily identifiable false alarm/confirmation of 
attack or instances where contact cannot be readily established/report of a false alarm is 
made under duress.  The ‘Priority’ of this task is set to ‘High’.  This task is complete 
when the attack is verified.   
c. U.S. Government Notification 
The name of this task is ‘U.S. Government Notification’.  This task is 
preceded by a set 3 hour time lag.  This time lag accounts for the time it would take for 
the shipping company to gather pertinent details regarding the attack to include ship type 
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and crew on board a best estimate of number of pirates on board and their demands.  The 
‘Duration’ of this task is set 30 minutes which accounts the first contact with the U.S. 
Government to relay information regarding the attack.  The ‘Priority’ of this task is set to 
‘High’.  The task is complete when the first representative in the U.S. government has 
been notified of the attack.  Following initial USG notification there is an assumed 8 hour 
time lag which accounts for dissemination of news of the attack to responsible elements 
within the USG.   
d. Corporate Input to the USG 
 The name of this task is ‘Corp input to USG’.  The duration of this task is 
set to 1 day.  This duration allows for the initial decision making process on behalf of the 
corporation on whether or not USG intervention is desired.  The ‘Priority’ of the ‘Corp 
input to USG’ is set as ‘High’.  The task is complete for the purposes of this model when 
the company decides it would like USG intervention.  This marks the end of the 
‘Monitor’ phase of the MOC decision making process and begins the ‘Assess’ phase of 
the MOC decision making process.   
e. Mission Analysis 
The name of this task is ‘Mission Analysis’.  This task is preceded by a 10 
minute time lag.  This lag accounts for the time the USG representative dealing with the 
company passes the information to MOC planners to begin planning for a military 
solution to the incident of piracy.  The ‘Duration’ of the ‘Mission Analysis’ task is set to 
5 hours and accounts for the time it would take to begin initial deliberate planning and 
identifying the anomalies surrounding the reported incident of piracy.  The ‘Priority’ for 
this task is set to ‘Medium’ because this task is being looked at by ISE which has other 
concurrent responsibilities within the MOC.  Those other tasks are not reflected in the 
model.  This task is complete when the unique aspects of the incident are identified and 
‘Mission Coordination’ is set to begin. 
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f. ‘Mission Coordination’ 
The name of this task is ‘Mission Coordination’.  ‘Mission Coordination’ 
is the initial assessment of where U.S. forces are operating in the region and liaison with 
additional forces identified in the ‘Mission Analysis’ task that may be required for the 
operation.  The ‘Duration’ of the task is set to 5 hours and accounts for the time to 
coordinate with regional forces as well as forces outside of the Area of Responsibility 
(AOR).  The ‘Priority’ of the ‘Mission Coordination’ task is set to Medium to reflect that 
forces desired may not be available and coordination is based on time management by 
COPS and the busy nature of a watch floor environment.  This task is complete when 
appropriate forces have been identified for an operation responding to an incident of 
piracy.     
g. Enemy Course of Action Development 
The name of this task is ‘ECOA Development’.  The ‘Duration’ of this 
task is set to 2 hours.  This task follows mission coordination to identify significant 
adversary capabilities and critical operational environment factors.  This includes 
analyzing enemy objectives, Centers of Gravity (COG).  Part of this process includes 
developing enemy most dangerous and most likely COAs.  This task is complete when 
the product supports Blue COA development.  The ‘Priority’ of the task is set to 
‘Medium’.   
h. Warning Order  
The name of this task is ‘Warning Order’.  This task begins, “Once the 
commander approves the mission following the Mission Analysis briefing and evaluates 
the factors affecting mission accomplishment…It serves as a preliminary notice of a 
forthcoming military action with an understanding that more information will follow after 
the COA is selected”  (JMO Deparment, Naval War College, 2008).  The ‘Duration’ for 
the ‘Warning Order’ task is set to 6 hours.  This accounts for generating a mission 
analysis briefing in an hour, an hour to give the brief, and three hours for the commander 
to decide upon the content of the warning order based upon the briefing presented to him.  
One hour to generate and disseminate the actual Warning Order message.  The ‘Priority’ 
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of the message is high based on the priority of the end product.  The task is complete 
when the ‘Warning Order’ has been issued.  This marks the end of the ‘Assess’ phase of 
the decision making process and marks the beginning of the Plan phase of the decision 
making process.   
i. Course of Action Development 
The name of this task is ‘COA Development’.  “COA development 
planning should consider all joint force capabilities and focus on contributing to the 
defeat/neutralization of the enemy’s Center of Gravity and the protection of the friendly 
COG”  (JMO Deparment, Naval War College, 2008).  The ‘Duration’ of COA 
Development is set to 3 hours to account for the development of three COA’s each taking 
an hour to develop.  The ‘Priority’ for COA development is set to high given the fact that 
given the time sensitive nature of this tasking all work will be devoted to developing each 
COA.  This task is complete when three different COA’s have been developed.   
j. Course of Action Coordination  
The name of this task is ‘COA Coordination’.  COA Coordination is 
marked by analysis of friendly COAs which is a vital step to War Gaming.  COA 
Coordination also compares Friendly COAs against the various ECOAs.  The ‘Duration’ 
of this task is set to 4 hours.  Priority for this task is ‘High’ because this is an essential 
step to the ‘War Gaming’ process.  This task is complete when Blue Force COAs are 
ready to be war gamed.   
k. Enemy Course of Action Refinement 
The name of this task is ‘ECOA Refine’.  This task adds granularity to the 
initial ECOAs tailoring them to counter the three possible blue COAs.  The ‘Duration’ 
for this process is set to 2 hours.  The ‘Priority’ is set to high.  The ‘ECOA Refine’ task is 
complete when the ECOAs have been war gamed against Blue COAs.   
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l. Course of Action Check 
The name of this task is ‘COA Check’.  This task allows the commander 
and staff to, “…develop and evaluate a list of important governing factors, consider each 
COA’s advantages and disadvantages identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make 
final tests for feasibility and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each” (JMO 
Deparment, Naval War College, 2008).  The ‘Duration’ of this task is set to 2 hours to 
account for overcoming identified disadvantages and a final check to ensure that the 
COA is achievable.  The ‘Priority’ is set to ‘High’.  This task is complete when the Blue 
COAs are ready to be presented to the decision maker for selection.         
m. Course of Action Decision  
The name of this task is COA Decision.  This task comes after evaluating 
all the presented COA’s.  “The staff identifies its preferred COA and makes a 
recommendation.  The staff then briefs the commander…After the decision briefing; the 
commander selects the COA that most effectively accomplishes the mission” (JMO 
Deparment, Naval War College, 2008).  For the purposes of this experiment the 
commander is the 5th Fleet Commander.  The ‘Duration’ of this task is set to 1 hour.  In 
this time the commander can deliberate on the presented COA’s, ask questions and make 
refinements to a final COA.  The ‘Priority’ is set to ‘High’.  This task is complete when 
the commander has decided upon one COA to accomplish the mission.   
n. Action Rehearsal 
The name of this task is called ‘Action Rehearsal’.  This is the tactical 
operator’s chance to conduct a physical walk through of the sequence of events to counter 
the act of piracy.  The duration of this task is set to 4 hours.  The learning time for this 
task is set to 1 day which allows for the action unit to learn the specifics of the mission 
and the duration of four hours accounts for rehearsal and briefing of the mission.  The 
‘Priority’ is set to High.  This task is complete when the action unit is ready to execute 
the mission.   
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o. Corporation’s Final Consent for Government Intervention 
The name of this task is ‘Corporate Go/No Go’.  This task is the shipping 
company’s final decision to allow for military action aboard their ship.  They will make 
this decision after being briefed by the military on the previously decided upon COA.  
The ‘Duration’ of this task is set to 1 hour.  The ‘Priority’ is set to High.  This task is 
complete when the Company gives the authorization for military intervention on its 
behalf to recover the vessel and crew.  This is the last task in the ‘Plan Phase’ of the 
decision cycle.  This is followed by the ‘Direct’ milestone which signifies the completion 
of the decision making cycle but does not include the actual physical operation to retake 
the vessel.  The below screen capture of the POWER software shows the setup of 
Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 15.   Screen Capture of “As Is” configuration  
4. Experiment 2 Tasks 
Experiment 2 looks to examine a change in the notification procedures and the 
input of the SSAS technology into the organizational structure.  The ‘Learning Days’, 
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‘Required Skill’, ‘Requirement Complexity’, ‘Solution Complexity’, ‘Uncertainty’, 
‘Effort Type’  and ‘Fixed Cost’ properties will be the same settings as they were in 
Experiment 1.  The ‘Milestones’ which make up the decision making cycle of ‘Monitor’, 
‘Assess’, ‘Plan’ and ‘Direct’ will remain the same.  The property settings of tasks 
associated with the ‘Assess’ and ‘Plan’ phases will remain the same as Experiment 1, 
helping to ensure experiment control.  The positions within the organization remain the 
same except for the Company Security Officer is no longer responsible for notification of 
the attack to the USG.  The first task is preceded by the SSAS inject transmitted directly 
from the merchant vessel being attacked to the I&W cell within the MOC.  The SSAS 
Inject is represented in POWER Model as an ‘Event’.  The duration of the ‘SSAS Inject’ 
is set to 1 minute.  1 minute accounts for satellite relay delay and the human in the I&W 
cell seeing the inject.       
a. SSAS Verification 
The name of this task is ‘SSAS Verif’.  This is preceded by a time lag of 2 
minutes to allow time for the watch stander to start the process of verification.  SSAS 
verification would be conducted by calling the ship itself or calling the company to see if 
they have received the same information or looking for a near immediate cancellation of 
the that alarm showing that it was erroneously activated.  The ‘Duration’ of this task is 
set to 10 minutes.  If the incident cannot be identified as a system malfunction or 
activated in error within 10 minutes, the I&W cell will proceed with the information and 
treat it as an actual incident of piracy.  The ‘Priority’ of this task is High given the time 
sensitive nature of the indication.  This task is complete when the I&W watch stander 
reports the incident to the MIOC Commander as well as COPS.   
b. SSAS Report 
The name of this task is ‘SSAS Report’.  This task represents the time 
I&W takes to report the incident of piracy to the MIOC commander and COPS.  The 
‘Duration’ of this task is set to 10 minutes.  The duration is set to 10 minutes due to the 
variety of ways communication of the incident occurs within the MOC.  Notification 
could be through voice communications, chat, and face to face meetings.  10 minutes 
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represents an average time any of these methods would take to include clearing up any 
questions that arise from those notified of the incident.  The ‘Priority’ is set to high.  This 
task is complete when other members of the MOC outside of the I&W cell are aware of 
the incident. The below screen capture of the POWER software shows the setup of 
Experiment 2.   
 
Figure 16.   Screen Capture of “To Be” configuration  
5. Methods for Interpreting Results for the Experiments 
The purpose of modeling these experiments is to capture quantitative data in order 
to facilitate numerical comparisons, measurable objectives and conduct mathematical 
analysis of data obtained.  Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 will be compared against each 
other to determine if a decreased variability in timeline to incidents of piracy can be 
achieved.  POWER will simulate each experiment 10,000 times.  Simulation is useful 
because studying responses to piracy is a large complex system with several interaction 
and interdependencies.  A mathematical model that gives empirical data is a more 
conclusive way to measure the effect of changes to an existing system than qualitative 
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means.  There are limitations to the use of simulations.  Simulations are not predictive 
given the results of the model.  Simulations cannot be run only once to arrive at an 
answer.  The model we built for this experiment is case specific and cannot be applied to 
other warfare areas.   
The goal of these experiments is to show a decrease in the variability in the time 
line of reporting and responding to an incident of piracy.  The removal of the shipping 
company security officer and shipping company deliberating on whether or not to seek 
USG intervention and the inject of automated reporting via SSAS can aid in intercepting 
the captured vessel as it steams to pirate safe havens on the coast of Somalia.  The 
automated SSAS report can provide confidence through speed and accuracy of reporting 





A. DATA COLLECTION 
The ‘As Is’ scenario for this thesis focused on the current command and control 
architecture for 5th Fleet Maritime Operations responding to an emergent act of piracy 
committed against a U.S. flagged merchant vessel.  The ‘To Be’ scenario examined a 
change in the notification procedures and the input of the SSAS technology into the 
organizational structure. Time becomes the critical factor in maritime operations planning 
when considering the distance needed to travel between prepositioned forces and forces 
dispatched to respond to an incident of piracy.  Analysis of the experiments conducted 
will help optimize positioning of these forces to counter future pirate threats.         
1. “As Is” 
 
Figure 17.   Gantt Chart for the current reporting configuration 
The “As Is” configuration provides several insights into decision making 
processes when current technologies and architectures are used.  Perhaps the most 
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important piece of information resulting from this experiment is the Simulation Duration.  
This is represented as the horizontal axis of the chart in Figure 17 which is contrasted 
against the individual tasks that make up the vertical axis of Figure 17.  The Simulation 
Duration for this experiment was 96 hours and 28 minutes.  This is the mean of 10,000 
runs and there is a standard deviation of 3 hours and 53 minutes.  The default repetition 
setting in the POW-ER model is 100, this was increased to 10,000 in order to ensure 
proper inferences could be made about the population (all MOC users) from this sample 
(actors in the model). The notional start date for this experiment was April 1, 2010. The 
simulated end date occurred on April 4, 2010. 
Another statistic important in interpreting Figure 17 is Direct Work.  Direct Work 
represents the “critical path” and which is depicted in red.  The critical path denotes the 
logical flow of work from start to finish with no re-work.  The Direct Work for this 
experiment is 36 hours and 40 minutes.  There is no deviation for Direct Work due to the 
design of the tasks in the model.  Should the task not be completed in its allotted amount 
of time it is then considered Re-Work.  Direct Work within the model occurs in a linear 
fashion, meaning all Direct Work (work in the critical path) stops until the Re-Work is 
completed.  The mean Re-Work for this experiment is 19 minutes with a deviation of one 
hour 52 minutes.  The mean deviation is so low due to the infrequency of its occurrence 
(0.01 of 10,000 runs).  The Re-Work is represented as “float” in Figure 17.   
When considering factors that either contribute to or detract from the timeliness of 
reporting incidents of piracy within a command and control system the amount of time 
required to complete specific tasks must be taken into account.  In the experiment using 
the “As Is” configuration the task identified as ‘Corp Input to the USG’ is the most time 
intensive.  The mean duration for this task in this experiment is 27 hours.  The deviation 
of the duration for this task is three hours and 32 minutes.  The Direct Work required to 
complete this task is 24 hours with a deviation of nine minutes. 
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Figure 18.   Task Duration in Days  
The duration of other tasks specific to this experiment and the work required to 
complete these tasks must be taken into account.  The duration of these tasks is broken 
down in Figure 18.  The vertical axis of Figure 18 is labeled by the name of the 
individual task. The horizontal axis is labeled as Volume in terms of FTE-days (as 
defined in Chapter III). This translates to time as fractions of a 24 hour day.  The duration 
of tasks unique to each model will yield the most information.  The duration of tasks 
shared between both experiments are less valuable since their variance lies at the fourth 
significant digit. This translates to a difference of mere seconds.         
The task representing the notification of the ship-owner for this configuration is 
labeled ‘Attack Notification’ in Figure 18.  The mean duration of this task is 12 minutes 
with no deviation over the 10,000 runs.  The duration of the Direct Work required to 
complete is ten minutes with a deviation of three seconds.  The task labeled ‘Attack 
Verification’ accounts for the company’s attempt to identify false alarms; this task has a 
mean duration of one hour and seven minutes.  There was no deviation of the duration of 
this task in this experiment.  The Direct Work required to complete this task is one hour.  
During the experiment there was a deviation of the Direct Work equaling 25 minutes.  
The last task specific to the “As Is” configuration of this model is the ‘USG Notification’ 
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task.  This task represents the initial contact made between the shipping company and the 
U.S. Government.  The mean duration of this task is 34 minutes with zero deviation.  The 
duration of the Direct Work for this task is 30 minutes, with a deviation of only ten 
seconds.  The combined duration of the tasks unique to this experiment is one day four 
hours and 53 minutes.     
2. “To Be” 
 
Figure 19.   Gantt chart for the desired reporting configuration 
The “To Be” configuration of the POW-ER model provided data points that, 
when properly examined, can offer means to improve the U.S. Navy’s methods for 
receiving notification of pirate attacks.  Much can be revealed from the statistic 
Simulation Duration in this model.  The Simulation Duration for this experiment has a 
mean of one day, 21 hours and 50 minutes.  This experiment consisted of 10,000 runs 
using this configuration and had a standard deviation of one hour and nine minutes.  The 
Direct Work for this experiment had a mean duration of one day, 11 hours and 20 
minutes.  The Simulation Duration is represented as the horizontal axis of Figure 19.  The 
Direct Work is shown in red and is labeled as “critical path” in Figure 19.  The deviation 
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for Direct Work was zero.  The Re Work for this experiment accounts for any task not 
completed upon its first attempt and is represented in Figure 19 as “float.”  The Re Work 
for this experiment had a mean of nine minutes with a standard deviation of 52 minutes. 
 
Figure 20.   Task Duration in Days 
Figure 20 displays the work volume in terms of FTE days for each specific task in 
the “To Be” Experiment.  The most time intensive task for this experiment is the 
generation and issuance of the Warning Order (WARNORD).  The mean duration of this 
task was ten hours and two minutes.  The standard deviation for this task was ten 
minutes.  Unique to this experiment were the tasks “SSAS report” and “SSAS Verif.”  
Both the tasks “SSAS report” and “SSAS Verif” had a mean duration of 12 minutes and a 
standard deviation of 11 seconds.  The Direct Work associated with each of these tasks 
had an equal mean duration of ten minutes and a standard deviation of three seconds.  
The combined duration of all the tasks specific to this experiment is ten hours and 26 




B. DATA ANALYSIS/KEY FINDINGS 
1. Scenario Tasking and Its Impact on Results 
Tasks specific to the “As Is” and those specific to the “To Be” experiment offer the 
clearest insight into the overall time required to respond to incidents of piracy.  These tasks 
highlight the differences in the reporting processes between ships and the U.S. Government.  
The tasks shared by both configurations are the same as they are tasks carried out as the 
assessment and planning phases of the response.  Keeping these tasks the same offers added 
control in the experiment.  The sum of the tasks unique to the “As Is” experiment is 28 hours 
and 53 minutes. This is 18 hours and 27 minutes longer than the time required to complete 
the tasks unique to the “To Be” experiment.  The “To Be” experiment had a mean duration of 
ten hours and 26 minutes for tasks unique to its configuration. 
In the case of the “As Is” configuration, the most time intensive task is the 
corporation’s input to the U.S. Government, which has a mean duration of 27 hours.  This 
is 16 hours and 58 minutes longer than the most time intensive task for the “To Be” 
configuration. The generation of the Warning Order has a mean duration ten hours and 
two minutes and is the most time intensive task of the “To Be” configuration.  The 
Warning Order having the longest duration is significant due to the fact it is a task in both 
configurations, thus it cannot be avoided.   
2. Backlog 
The backlog within an experiment shows where the sequence of tasks slows or 
stops due to the action/inaction of a specific position.  It is measured in terms of percent 
vs. time.  This is useful when contrasting operational changes within a C2 structure.  In 
the experiment modeling the current reporting system (As Is), the greatest backlog occurs 
when the shipping company via the Company Security Officer must provide initial 
notification and input to the U.S. Government.  This backlog reaches 100% in the first 
simulated day.  In the experiment modeling the “To Be” reporting system, the greatest 
backlog achieved was measured at 42.66%, this was caused by the U.S. Government 
position while completing the task ‘Mission Coordination’.   
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The reduction in the highest backlog is significant because the Mission 
Coordination task is in both experiments.  Logically the U.S. Government backlog in the 
“As Is” experiment was measured at 42.64%, resulting in a mean difference of 0.02% 
between experiment configurations.  It can then be stated that the impact of removing the 
Company Security Officer’s backlog directly results in a time savings of 27 hours with a 
deviation of nine minutes. 
 
Figure 21.   Position Backlog for “As Is” configuration  
 
Figure 22.   Position Backlog for “To Be” configuration  
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C. IMPLICATIONS  
The small changes to the C2 structure for reporting incidents of piracy led to the 
decrease in the time the USN can dispatch ships to intercept the pirated vessel and 
decreased the time it takes for the MOC to plan an operation to retake the pirated vessel.  
The technologies inject with SSAS and a change in notification from the shipping 
company’s Security Officer to the I&W watch floor team at the MOC has impact on two 
different timelines.  The first timeline is the time it takes to notify USN ships in order to 
intercept the pirated vessel and the second timeline is the time it takes the USN to 
develop a plan to present to the shipping company to retake the ship.   
The ‘To Be’ scenario is an accurate and consistent command structure for the 
operational level of war.  The proposed MOC construct offers the benefits of timely data 
and accurate information on a consistent basis.  Reassurance of a consistent response 
could allow the MOC to replace presidential involvement further decreasing the time to 
response.  Presidential involvement was prevalent in previous instances of piracy against 
U.S. shipping such as with the Alabama and in the 1800’s against the Barbary Pirates, 
however, it was the on-scene-commanders’ assessment of the situation that decided the 
action.  The ‘To Be’ model with a faster time to plan and earlier intercept allows greater 
opportunity to carry out commander’s intent by the on-scene-commander.  
 The decrease in time with the ‘To Be’ scenario enables an optimization of force 
placement to counter individual acts of piracy vice happening to be in close proximity as 
an attack happens.  Over time trends in pirate attacks can be analyzed to preposition USN 
ships.  Positioning of these ships can now be based upon the ‘To Be’ model which 
reduces the time to plan and respond.  Given a reduction in time required to respond, 
fewer numbers of U.S. ships are required to cover the ever increasing area of pirate 
operations.  Optimized force placement can extend protected shipping lanes which can 
challenge the pirates’ ability to conduct long range operations.  A condensed response 
time could have prevented the botched hostage exchange of Captain Phillips of the 
Alabama incident.     
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In the ‘To Be’ model, the inject, of SSAS provides geographic location of the 
pirated ship as well as more timely reporting directly to the MOC.  The known location 
and other near real time information such as ships course and speed could have benefitted 
the recovery of the Achille Lauro.  The inability to track and report the ships position 
hindered U.S. planners to dispatch forces.  This inability prevented an early and visible 
U.S. presence that might have saved the life of Leon Klinghofer.     
Further implication of the ‘To Be’ model is that it can stand as the C2 structure 
for response to a U.S. merchant ship involved in an incident of piracy in any AOR. As 
USN numbered fleets implement their MOCs, global U.S. shipping deserves a consistent 
response from fleet to fleet.  Implementation of the ‘To Be’ model in all USN numbered 
fleets would guarantee this consistent response.  A reliable and consistent response yields 
greater cooperation with shipping companies notably foreign owned companies with U.S. 
flagged shipping.  Success of these responses would urge foreign navies to standardize 
their responses allowing for greater cooperation in coalition efforts to respond to piracy.   
1. Factors Affecting Timing 
There are several critical events associated with a successful pirate attack on a 
merchant ship.  There is the time the attack begins, the time the ship is taken, the time the 
USN is notified (in order to vector USN ships to the merchant ship), and the time the 
merchant ship, under the control of pirates, begins its return to one of the Somali ports.  
The below figure is a timeline representing critical times in order of occurrence and a 
legend of the variables that represent each critical time.   
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Figure 23.   Timeline of Critical Times associated with a successful pirate attack. 
The time of notification in this instance is assumed to be the time the USN is 
notified of the incident and can dispatch surface ships to intercept the pirated vessel but 
cannot retake the ship.   This first timeline shows that TN1 > TN2.  TN1 = Attack 
Notification + Attack Verification + USG Notification.  TN2 = SSAS Notification + SSAS 
Verification.   These establish the variable T in a classic time/distance problem where: 
 
Where D = distance in nautical miles, R = Rate in knots and T = time measured in 
hours and minutes.  The rates involved are those of the pirated vessel and those of USN 
ships dispatched to interdict the pirated vessel.  In nearly all instances the Rate of the 
USN ship is greater than that of the pirated vessel such that RUSN Ship > RPirated Vessel.  
Classically the pirates have relied on a large TN1 (time to notification), while the USN has 
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relied on heavy concentration of forces and small variation in RPirated Vessel.  This model 
highlights the reduction in time to TN2 to decrease the distance to intercept pirated 
vessels.   
 According to results from the simulation TN1 = 12 minutes + 1 hour and 7 
minutes + 34 minutes = 1 hour and 53 minutes.   TN2 = 12 minutes + 12 minutes = 24 
minutes.  The implications of this are illustrated in the following scenario of a pirated 
vessel steaming back to port at 15 knots.  Fifteen knots was chosen to reflect the top 
speed at which a U.S. flagged motor vessel could steam with engineers under duress.  
Looking at this from a classic time/distance problem we have the following distances the 
pirated vessel could cover with the two different notification times: 
 
Where D = distance in nautical miles, R = Rate assumed to be 15 knots and T = 




‘As Is’ reporting procedures utilizing TN1 have the pirated vessel traveling 
approximately 28 nm whereas ‘To Be’ reporting procedures utilizing TN2 have the pirated 
vessel traveling approximately 6 nm.  These relatively small distances would have a large 
impact in the crowded waters of the GOA.  In the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean these 
small distance gains can be exploited by optimally positioned surface forces.     
The second timeline involving the Navy’s ability to run through the planning 
process to develop a course of action in approximately half  the time from the ‘As Is’ 
case to the ‘To Be’ case.  The ability to be notified of an incident of piracy, develop a 
plan and brief that plan to the civilian shipping corporation is approximately 96 hours 
under the ‘As Is’ architecture.  That time is approximately 48 hours under the ‘To Be’ 
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Architecture.  Using the previous time/distance problem with the same rate of 15 knots 
but using 96 hours for the time in the ‘As Is’ problem and 48 hours in the ‘To Be’ 
problem the following distances were calculated: 
 
Where D = distance in nautical miles, R = Rate assumed to be 15 knots and T = 
time measured in hours and minutes.   
 
 
Interdiction of a pirated vessel is feasible in terms of having an asset on scene to 
provide situation reports as events unfold or serve as a platform to launch operations from 
against the pirated vessel.  The USN has proven capable of dispatching forces upon 
receiving word of a pirate attack all too often arriving on scene awaiting further orders to 
resolve the situation.   The real time savings of the ‘To Be’ model provide the ship and 
the on-scene commander guidance that previously suffered significant time delays.  The 
above numbers involving the ability of the USN to run through the planning process 
provide a staggering decrease in the amount of time the USN can develop a plan and have 
designated forces ready to carry out that plan.  The ‘As Is’ C2 structure has a plan being 
delivered approximately 96 hours after the notification of a successful pirate attack, 
giving the pirates a range of about 1,440 nm at 15 knots to return to port.   
The ‘To Be’ timeline has significant time savings from notification of the pirate 
attack until a plan is prepared and units are identified and designated.  The time duration 
for the ‘To Be’ C2 architecture is approximately 48 hours, which for the pirates steaming 
at 15 knots is a range of 720 nm.  The changes to the C2 structure from the ‘As Is’ to the 
‘To Be’ can seriously impact long range pirate activities.  An unintended consequence of 
current anti-piracy operations was driving pirate activities further from the coast of 
Somalia with documented attacks occurring 1350 nm east of Mogadishu.  Under the ‘As 
Is’ C2 structure the pirated vessel could return to port before the planning process could 
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be finalized.  Under the ‘To Be’ C2 structure a plan to retake this vessel could developed 
and ready to execute while the pirated vessel is still approximately 700 nm off the coast 
of Somalia.   
The direct notification of a pirate attack to the MOC I&W cell means that long-
range pirate activities greater than 800 nm off the coast of Somalia can have Navy assets 
ready to execute the direction given by the MOC planners while the vessel is still 
approximately 100 nm off the coast and 88 nm outside of territorial waters.  According to 
results from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were approximately 65 
successful or attempted attacks in 2010, IVO Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, current 
as of 12 May 2010.  Forty-eight of those attacks occurred in the Indian Ocean and of 
those 48 approximately 34 attacks occurred (12 of which were successful) at a distance 
near 800 nm from Mogadishu.  This thesis recognizes that pirated vessels return to 
several port towns in Somalia, to include Mogadishu, but for the purposes of statistical 
analysis Mogadishu serves as a central geographic location with pirate towns to the north 
and south of Mogadishu.  The below graphic shows a range ring of approximately 800 
nm from Mogadishu showing which pirate attacks fall within that ring and which fall 
outside of it.  
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Figure 24.   Pirate Attack Reporting Map  (From International Maritime Bureau, 2010) 
Thirty-four out of 48 attacks fell outside of 800 nm from Mogadishu or 71% of 
attacks in the Indian Ocean occurred outside of 800 nm.  According to the simulation run 
the USN could have gone through the planning process and have forces ready to execute 
a plan for 71% of all pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean before they were able to return to 
port.  Twelve out of 34 of those attacks were successful and occurred outside of 800 nm 
from Mogadishu or 35%.  If these successful attacks were reported through the ‘To Be’ 
C2 structure the USN could develop courses of action to present to the shipping company 
and be ready to execute those orders before the pirated vessel returned to port.   
2. Hypothetical Application 
It is important to put the results of these experiments in the context of possible 
future attacks on merchant shipping by pirates.  A notional scenario involves a U.S. 
flagged container ship steaming off the coast of Somalia.  This ship is attacked and driven 
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toward the pirate town of Harardhere 863 nm from the attack.  The ship is moving at a 
speed of 15 knots.  There are two U.S. Navy surface ships in the area, USN Ship 1 is 361 
nm from the attack.  USN Ship 2 is 544 nm from the attack.  It is assumed the U.S. Navy 
ships are capable of making 30 knots to intercept the pirate ship. 
 
Figure 25.   Hypothetical scenario (Google Earth, 2010) 
In this scenario using the “As Is” reporting architecture, the time between the 
attack and notification of the U.S. Government is one hour and 53 minutes. Given an 
estimated speed of 15 knots, the pirate ship will have traveled 28.25 nm down its track to 
Harardhere during this time period.  Using the “To Be” method of notification 24 minutes 
elapse between the attack and U.S. Government notification.  At a speed of 15 knots, this 
means the victim ship would only travel six nautical miles towards Harardhere.   
Assuming U.S. Navy ships are dispatched instantly upon notification and 
steaming at a speed of 30 knots U.S.N., ship 1 must travel 238 nm to intercept the victim 
ship using the “As Is” reporting architecture.  This will intercept the victim ship 246 nm 
from the site of the attack.  Under the proposed “To Be” reporting architecture, the 
U.S.N. ship 1 would travel 267 nm at a speed of 30 knots to intercept the vessel 211 













Table 1.   U.S.N. ship response and interception 
The direct benefits of the proposed “To Be” configuration are not immediately 
apparent.  The time to intercept and the distance required to travel to intercept are longer 
under the “To Be” architecture, however the time of notification, and the distance from 
the attack site is shorter.  Therefore there are modest gains to be made in this earlier 
notification and dispatch of vessels in the area.  The most significant gains are realized 
when the theater-wide response is taken into account. 
The time required to enact a plan developed is represented when the ‘Direct’ 
milestone is met.  The time to ‘Direct’ is equal to the Simulation Duration.  The time to 
Direct under the “As Is” configuration is 96 hours and 28 minutes.  The time required for 
the victim ship to be successfully maneuvered back to Harardhere is 57 hours and 32 
minutes.  Therefore the victim ship will have been in the pirate’s port for one day 14 
hours and 28 minutes.  The time to Direct in the “To Be” configuration is one day four 
hours and 53 minutes.  This direction comes with 152 nm remaining before the pirates 




Figure 26.   Scenario times of notification and direction  (Google Earth, 2010) 
The advantage of intervention so far out to sea is the extension of lines of 
communication and supply on the part of the pirates.  Any attempts to resupply the 
pirates or get them off the ship will be apparent to U.S. Forces.  This further aides the 
United States in controlling either the terms of surrender or the negotiations of moneys to 
be paid.  The other advantage of countering acts of piracy in international waters is the 
ability to act unilaterally with only the permission of the shipping company required.  
The issue of military action by the United States on a commercial vessel in a sovereign 
country’s territorial waters is avoided altogether.  Given the safe transit routes through 
waters near Somalia and the tightening grip of EU and U.S. Navy forces in those waters 
attacks with an ever increasing range from Somalia is highly likely.  As of March 12, 12 
of 48 attacks in 2010 have occurred at a distance of 800 nm or more from Somalia. 
   








Spikes in events of piracy have been increasing since 2006, and the international 
community can no longer ignore this problem.  Legal, socio-economic, and technological 
issues hinder multi-national efforts to combat piracy effectively. Response to events of 
piracy are oftentimes late, as reporting of incidents is also mired in legal issues; however, 
technology does exist that can notify companies that a ship is being attacked by pirates as 
the attack occurs. 
Though communications technology evolved greatly between the times of 
Decatur’s Mediterranean Squadron and the Mayaguez, the response by the Ford 
Administration was mired by unnecessary complexities in the reporting structure.  This 
became evident at the initial notification of the attack on the Mayaguez.  Initial 
notification had to be relayed three times, resulting in a six-hour delay between initial 
notification of the attack and notification of President Ford.  The complex web of 
communication required to direct tactical forces must be streamlined to provide an agile 
response.   
Small changes to the processes within the C2 structure can transform piracy 
reporting from the “As Is” piracy reporting process to the “To Be” reporting process, 
effectively halving the time required to give tactical direction. These changes to 
processes are made possible in this case by both technologies currently used and 
commercially available technology not currently used by the DoD. The enabling 
technology in this case, is the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) and The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has mandated that all ships greater than 500 gross tons 
(United States Coast Guard, 2004) shall be equipped with an SSAS. The problem lies in 
who should receive the SSAS attack alert notification. Currently, these distress signals 
only go to the company that owns the ship. With the increase in frequency and range of 
these attacks, the Operational-level commander must have as much pertinent information 
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as soon as possible. A direct inject of SSAS information into a Navy Maritime 
Operations Center will enable a faster response time to piracy events and allow for trend 
analysis of where pirate attacks are occurring.  
This thesis was able to show the benefits of streamlining reports to the U.S. 
Navy’s 5th Fleet MOC.  These benefits were shown using the POW-ER modeling 
software.  POW-ER is an inexpensive method to model organizational structures yielding 
quantitative data. Given the demands on personnel actively responding to ongoing acts of 
piracy, it was not feasible to physically demonstrate the hypothesis of the thesis in the 
real-world.  POW-ER stands as an efficient way to expand the scope of this research by 
looking at other areas the C2 structure can be streamlined in reporting and responding to 
incidents of piracy.   
The direct notification of a pirate attack to a Maritime Operations Center means 
pirate activities greater than 800 nm off the coast of Somalia will face Navy assets ready 
to execute the direction given by MOC planners while the vessel is still approximately 
100 nm off the coast and 88 nm outside of territorial waters. According to results from 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were approximately 65 successful or 
attempted attacks in 2010, in the vicinity Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, current as 
of 12 May 2010. Forty-eight of those attacks occurred in the Indian Ocean, of which 34 
occurred at a distance near 800 nm from Mogadishu, and of these, 12 were successful.  
This thesis recognizes that pirated vessels return to several port towns in Somalia, to 
include Mogadishu, but for the purposes of our statistical analysis, Mogadishu serves as a 
central geographic location with pirate towns to the north and south of Mogadishu. 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The United States stands ready to repel these pirates and but needs the capable 
and available tools to execute the mission. Although this thesis outlines the advantages of 
a Command and Control system using SSAS, there are many aspects of implementation 
that remain to be studied. Some of these aspects include:  
1. Interface requirements between existing DoD/DoN networks and 
commercially available SSAS systems.  
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2. Legal ramifications of compliance to reporting regulation by U.S. flagged 
merchant shipping.  
3. Role of the U.S. Coast Guard in enforcing standards for maintenance and 
operability of SSAS systems aboard U.S. flagged merchant ships.  
4. Model existing Somali pirate C2 structures in POW-ER to identify critical 
areas of weakness for exploit by U.S. forces.  
5. Benefit analysis of lower echelon commanders being given operational 
tasking authority; previous singular incidents of piracy involving U.S. 
shipping has required tasking from the President of the United States.  
6. Cost benefit analysis of re-flagging foreign flagged ships (e.g. insurance 
savings).  
7. Means of force optimization within the HOA AOR given the time savings 
discovered through C2 changes in this thesis.  
For all the variability in the battle against maritime piracy, the constant that stands 
head and shoulders above the rest is the need for quick and effective command and 
control processes. These processes must come from streamlined hierarchical 
organization.  With advances in both ship monitoring and communication, commercial 
shipping companies and the U.S. Navy must forge a strong partnership to share 
information to prevent and react to pirate attacks.  Using the ideas posited in this thesis to 
streamline reporting and optimize U.S. Navy asset placement will help tip the balance of 
this fight back in favor of those seeking to use the sea for legitimate commerce.     
 84
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahmed, M. (2009, December 01). Reuters. Retrieved December 10, 2009, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSGEE5AS0EV 
American merchant marine at war. (2000). Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by 
Khmer Rouge forces in May 1975. Retrieved February 17, 2010, from The 
American Merchant Marine at War: http://www.usmm.org/mayaguez.html 
Bahadur, J. (2009, April 16). East Africa forum. Retrieved October 13, 2009, from 
http://www.eastafricaforum.net/2009/04/23/im-not-a-pirate-im-the-saviour-of-the-
sea/ 
Barrett, F., & Nissen, M. (2008). Self organization and synchronization at the edge: 
Situated action, identity and improvisation. International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium (pp. 1–18). Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
BBC. (2002, May 7). H2G2. Retrieved February 15, 2010, from BBC: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A730900 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1975). After action report: U.S. military 
operations S.S. Mayaguez/Kaoh Tang 12–15 May 1975. Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
CJCS. (1995). Joint publication 6.0. Washington, D.C.: JCS. 
Commons, H. (2010, January 17). Military affairs>> personell. Retrieved February 1, 
2010, from History Commons: 
http://www.historycommons.org/topic.jsp?topic=topic_personnel 
Creveld, M. V. (1985). Command in war.Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard 
College. 
DeKay, J. T. (2004). A rage for glory: The life of commodore Stephen Deatur USN. New 
York: Free Press. 
Department of the Navy. (2000). The U.S. Navy in the Cold War Era, 1945–1991. 
Retrieved February 15, 2010, from U.S. Navy Heritage and History Command: 
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/coldwar-1.htm 
Department of the Navy. (2008). Maritime Operations Center NTTP 3-32.1. Newport, 




Dillon, D.R. (2005) SAIS Review. Retrieved January 5, 2010, from: 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v025/25.1dillon.html 
Elliott, B. J. (2009, April 30). Klein: ‘Peace partner’ helped free terrorist who killed 
American. Leader of infamous Achille Lauro hijacking released yesterday from 
Italian prison. Retrieved February 15, 2010, from RBO: 
therealbarackobama.files.wordpress.com/2009/0 
Fraser, C. C. (1920). Boys' book of sea fights. New York: Thomas Y Crowell. 
Google Earth. (2010, April 19). Google Earth. Retrieved April 10, 2010, from Google 
Earth: http//earth.google.co/gulfofaiden 
Guilmartin, J. F. (1995). A very short war: The Mayaguez and the battle of Koh Tang. 
College Station : Texas A&M University Press. 
Hunter, R. (2008, October 28). Somali pirates living the highlife. Retrieved January 12, 
2010, from BBC News online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm 
International Expert Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. (2008). Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia. Nairobi: United Nations. 
International Maritime Bureau. (2010, April). IMB piracy reporting center. Retrieved 
April 19, 2010, from http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=12 
JMO Deparment, Naval War College. (2008). Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) 
workbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College. 
Koburger, C. (2010). Selamat Datang, Kapitan: Post WWII piracy in the South China 
Sea. In F. R. Fellman, Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Cases 
(pp. 65-77). Newport, RI: Naval War College Press. 
Leavitt, H. J. (1965). Applied organizational change in industry: Structural, technological 
and humanistic approaches. In H. J. Leavitt, Handbook of organizations (pp. 
1144–1145). Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Leiner, F. C. (2006). End of Barbary terror: America's 1815 war against the pirates of 
north africa. London: Oxford University Press, Inc. 
Looney, J. P. (2006). Computational modeling and analysis of networked organizational 
planning in a coalition maritime strike environment. 2006 Command and Control 
Research and tech symposium: The state of the art and the state of the practice 
(pp. 1–37). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Malte-Brun, C. Barbary Coast. (1837).  Atlas Complet du Precis de la Geographie 
Universelle. Paris: Aimé André, libraire-éditeur. 
 87
Marine Officer. (2009). Don't give up the ship! Quick thinking and a boatload of know-
how saves the MAERSK ALABAMA. Marine Officer, 173, 6–18. 
Mojon, J.-M. (2009, October 29). The Middle East online. Retrieved December 01, 2009, 
from http://www.middle-east-online.com/English/?id=35360 
Murphy, M. N. (2009). Chapter one: Contemporary piracy. Adelphi Series 47:388 , 11–
44. 
Office of the Joint Seceratary. (1976). CINCPAC Command History—Appendix VI—SS 
Mayaguez Incident. San Francisco: Office of the Joint Seceratary Command 
History Branch . 
Paust, J. J. (1976). The seizure and recovery of the Mayaguez. Yale Law Journal, 84, 
774–806. 
Ploch, B. O. (2008). Piracy off the coast of Africa. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
Quérouil, M. (2008, October 27). Saturnic's Journal. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from 
http://saturnic.livejournal.com/346437.html 
Rice, X. (2010, March 23). The Guardian. Retrieved April 19, 2010, from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/23/somali-pirates-hijack-turkish-ship 
Sundland, C. (2008). Transforming data and metadata into actionable intelligence and 
information within the maritime domain. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
United States Coast Guard. (2004). Coast guard instruction 3120.3. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Coast Guard. 
Weaver, M. (2009, April 10). Somali pirates vow to take on U.S. military might if 
attacked. Retrieved February 5, 2010, from The Guardian: 
www.theguardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/10/somali-pirates-hostage-us-military 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 89
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3.  Secretary of the Navy  
Department of the United States Navy  
Washington, District of Columbia  
 
4.  OPNAV N3/N5  
 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, District of Columbia  
 
5.  Naval Forces Central Command  
 Manama, Bahrain 
  
6.  Joint and National Systems Division Surveillance Systems  
 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center  
San Diego, California  
 
7.  Program Executive Officer Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and  
 Intelligence Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center  
Charleston, South Carolina  
 
8.  Dr. Dan C. Boger  
 Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
 
9.  Dr. Mark Nissen  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
 
10.  Steven J. Iatrou  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
 
11. Jeffrey E. Kline  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
 
12. Daniel Warren  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
